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History

William J. Stephens; Some Cases in Point (104 pp.)
Advisor: Prof. Michael Mayer
This Master's Thesis analyzes the frontier legal practice of William J. Stephens, an
attorney who practiced in Missoula County during the last third of the nineteenth century.
The practice demonstrably reflected historical influences, including both primitive AngloSaxon practice as well as the more erudite teachings o f the Inns of Court.
Bom in Ireland, Stephens came to America in time to experience the California gold
msh. He spent a short time as a miner and as a merchant before taking up the practice of law
in 1860. Stephens followed the mining camps, opening practices in Virginia City, Nevada,
Idaho City Idaho, and Deer Lodge, Montana before settling in Missoula, Montana.
Missoula County litigation records reveal similarities between the cases Stephens
handled and primitive Anglo-Saxon procedure. These include the use o f oaths verifying the
truthfulness of complaints and answers, an unvarying reliance upon pre-trial seizure of the
subject matter, and jury trials. Excepting the last mentioned, these same factors distinguish
frontier practice from modem practice. As to jury trials, frontier jurys had more latitude than
modern ones.
Stephens handled numerous mining disputes, including matters within the purview of
the so-called "miners' codes." Many suits were upon promissory notes, which were used as
instruments of consumer credit and contract documents as well as evidences of ordinary
borrowing. Many suits were brought upon the "common counts," further evidencing
reluctance to employ attorneys as draftsmen. Torts to the person were rare, further
distinguishing frontier practice from modern practice after the tort "revolution." The growth
of the Town o f Missoula in the 1880s is discernable from its litigation records, particularly
after the arrival of the Northern Pacific Railroad, in the court cases become lengthier, more
complex, more commercial, and concern greater dollar sums in issue.
While other commentators have striven to point out that, allowing for its more
colorful vignettes, frontier lawyers demonstrated a degree a care and skill which would belie
media impressions. This study takes that observation further. If the aim of litigation is fair,
cost-efficient dispute resolution, then practice in frontier Missoula County was superior to
modern practice.
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W ILLIA M J. STEPHENS: SOME CASES IN POINT

Preface

This Master’s Thesis shall study the law practice of William J. Stephens, who practiced
law in Missoula County, Montana, in the last third of the nineteenth century. The direction
o f its narrative will move from the general to the specific, from an outline of the broader
influences of the law to a detailed description of these influences in the practice of one lawyer,
in one frontier county, in one fragment of time. The choice of Missoula County stems simply
from logistic convenience occasioned by the proximity of the Missoula County courthouse
to the University of Montana. The choice of Stephens stems from his high level o f litigious
activity and his relentless character.
This "relentless" element of Stephen's character undoubtedly sprang from many
sources. From what is known about his life, one can surmise that his mother's death during
his own childbirth, a hearty upbringing in County Dublin, Ireland, and, what he described as
liis early assumption of "life's responsibilities," forged a strong and resolute man. As a young
man, his life intersected another influence: the Anglo-American common law. Through his
career, Stephens became something more than another tough, resourceful, nineteenth century
immigrant. Beyond being a lawyer, a court clerk, a state representative, and a judge,
Stephens emerged as a true man of the law. Like so many others before and after him,
Stephens adopted the patterned response to conflict which defines the lawyer, the relentless
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dissection of human controversy into correlative rights and obligations. Stephen's practice
provides an excellent opportunity to study a lawyer's real usefiilness to his clients. He almost
never represented a fragmented body of shareholders. Stephens own friends and neighbors
felt the impact of the results he obtained in and out o f court. Like any lawyer, he had to face
his clients' various accusers and tormentors; but he also had to face his clients. Since
Stephens practiced in what was then a small, frontier community, his impact can be measured
with particular clarity.
I would be remiss in my obligations if I failed to acknowledge the able assistance of
Marcia Porter of the Records Management Department of the County of Missoula, as well
as her staff, Betty Labelle, Kurt Fuchs, and Beth Sobolik. Each of these people bring an
appreciation for the Western Montana's heritage to the efficient discharge of their duties. In
another arena, William Jones, Esq., of the law firm of Garlington, Lohn, and Robinson,
provided great encouragement and directional assistance. Mrs. Audra Broman of Missoula,
Montana, who has accumulated a large body o f information concerning early Missoula,
graciously opened her files to me, thereby contributing to this effort. Mrs. Broman's records
are the fruits of decades of patient compilation, and her efforts have been motivated solely by
a love for history. I also have had the excellent good fortune to make the acquaintance o f Ms.
Heather Hawley of Seattle, Washington. Ms. Hawley is the great-great granddaughter of
William J. Stephens. She assumed the duties of family historian and has tirelessly gathered,
and graciously made available to me, important information concerning her family. This thesis
would be much poorer without her assistance.
I am greatly indebted to Professors Linda Frey, Hayden Ausland, Richard Drake, and
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Michael Mayer, each of the University of Montana. Each has taken an interest in my
progress, provided encouragement, and personified the best standards of scholarship. Of
these. Dr. Mayer deserves a special praise. He has served as my advisor, and has, without
exaggeration, set a standard in that capacity. Additionally, he provided vital assistance with
this thesis, in the form of invaluable advice, editing, and encouragement. Observing him, I
have come to understand that my thesis, or that of any of his students', is also his contribution
to the Department, the University, and to our accumulated heritage.
Lastly, I must thank my wife Melissa who, by example, serves as a continuous
reminder that we daily preserve or diminish our civilization by the standards we set for
ourselves.
It is hoped that my study of Stephens' cases provides some insight into the real world
of frontier law, bringing to bear, as it does, my experience as a practicing attorney. In a larger
sense, it is also hoped that this study helps to illuminate the functioning and the evolution of
the legal process.
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Introduction

Two forces pull the law in different directions. One is populist, for lack o f a better
word, and the other, also imperfectly labeled, is scientific. The populist thrust is the original
legal impulse of the Anglo-Saxon people. This may be best described as custom. It originates
from the common understandings and expectations of ordinary people. It articulates the
common sense of the people.
The scientific thrust, on the other hand, originates in the perceptions o f unusually
astute minds. Far from articulating the common sense of the people, it expresses what
ordinary people cannot see. This is the elitist tradition in the law. It presumes that long study
of legal theory and interaction with the legal process produces a sensitivity that exceeds the
boundaries of ordinary common sense. It also presumes to discover and formulate what
ordinary people could not discover and formulate. This is the legal "science" o f the Inns of
Court of the fifteenth century, as well as the legal science of Christopher Columbus Landgell,
and, especially, the judicial activism currently in vogue. It exceeds the modest pretensions
o f the common law judges to discover the law in the minds and hearts of the people; it
searches for the law in the recesses o f higher science. Unfortunately, this scientific law can
only be found in the minds of other lawyers. That this higher science has discovered rights
and obligations that common sense never imagined should embolden skeptics. It should also
provoke a measure o f modesty in legal community.

Instead, however, the public’s

bewilderment only confirms the legal profession's superior assurance.
The diverse social origins of nineteenth century lawyers fed the tensions between
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custom and science. Historically lawyers came from the most privileged classes. This was
true in late medieval England, as represented at the Inns o f Court, and would remain largely
true in early America. The nineteenth century, however, witnessed a widening o f professional
opportunity for persons of modest lineage. Abraham Lincoln, for example, used a law book
and a candle to leverage himself into immortality. William J. Stephens also came from humble
origins, and the study of law provided him with social prominence, public office, and a fortune
in real estate. Like Lincoln, Stephens demonstrated sound business acumen in seeking his
legal fortune on the frontier, where the distance between anonymity and community
leadership was quite short. Trained in San Francisco, Stephens followed the prospectors to
Western Montana, feverishly mined their disputes for legal business, and prudently spent his
earnings on real estate and sound, adequately secured loans.
Differences in professional training and admission standards also promoted the gulf
between custom and science. In Stephens' day, certification to practice was not predicated
upon formal training. Missoula provided an excellent opportunity to study the quality of
unschooled practice, its reactions to legal currents, and its value to an infant community.
How did the people o f Missoula, newcomers all, receive their early lawyers? While this
question can never be answered with perfect accuracy, there is no doubt that, whatever their
opinions, they rang their lawyers' doors with astonishing frequency.
To put Stephens' career into perspective, the first chapter discusses some of the
historical influences which give dimension to a frontier practice. These forces cannot be
adequately outlined if ancient forces are ignored. Legal historians agree that all modern
institutions have older antecedents. However, most studies focus upon contemporary, or then
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contemporary, factors, and ignore ancient origins. At the same time, a thesis centering upon
the practice of a nineteenth century Missoula lawyer cannot also serve as a treatise covering
two thousand years of legal history. Therefore, these brief remarks are confined to a few
observations about Anglo-Saxon common law and the Inns of Court. The former represents
the populist tradition, and the latter the elitist. Chapter 1 also presents a short discussion of
American legal trends. The second chapter covers the life o f William J. Stephens and the
development o f the town of Missoula.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 treat the cases litigated by Stephens. Chapter 3, after briefly
detailing some of Stephens' early appearances in Missoula County, discusses legal procedure
in use in the 1870's. It focuses on highlighting continuities and discontinuities between the
procedures in use in the Anglo-Saxon period, in frontier Missoula, and in modem practice.
Chapter 4 studies the substantive causes of action themselves, allowing the claims to portray
human interaction in a frontier society. Chapter 5 uses cases from the ensuing decade, the
1880's, to demonstrate the evolution o f Stephens' practice and the community of Missoula.
The types of cases presented and the incidentals appertaining to these cases
demonstrate the usefulness of ordinary litigation records in portraying the life of a community.
Litigation files present a uniquely incisive vantage from which to experience the real workings
o f daily life. These records provide a much more telling picture than other legal records,
which tend to serve impersonally as evidence of statistical tendencies. They are more
trustworthy than letters and reminiscences, which by necessity are random and
unrepresentative. They are the closest thing we have to motion pictures; in fact, the images
preserved in the files are more intimate than a camera can ordinarily capture. Furthermore,
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8
the fact that lawyers cost money, while sad for the general public, is a boon for the historian.
People do not bring idle chatter to a lawyer; they bring real controversies about real and
immediate concerns. Human interaction distills itself into human controversy, and from
controversy into litigation records. For all its posturing and abstraction, litigation possesses
a wonderful sincerity.
Litigation is a process designed to facilitate the non-violent resolution of human
conflicts. Every human community needs an orderly dispute resolution apparatus. Our
system is, and always has been, the target o f gibes to the effect that it unduly abstracts and
complicates disputes. The cases and materials discussed in the following pages draw a picture
of litigation that contrasts quite favorably with what we have today. Whatever the costs and
frustrations faced by Stephens' clients, they at least had a system that was more about solving,
and less about promoting, interpersonal disputes than what we have today.
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Chapter 1. Two Vectors

In part, American judicial proceedings trace to the periodic assemblies of the
Germanic tribes. Meetings of the "hundreds," the earliest Germanic military and political
divisions, date from before the Anglo-Saxon migration to England.

They decided all

controversies, assessed punishments, and collected dues; in short, they served as the entire
judicial machinery.^

Anglo-Saxon immigrants brought these rude "courts," and the

procedures associated with them, to England. In the course o f these migrations entire
communities came under the direction of their political leaders. Naturally, these migrants
sought the comfort o f their own customs as they became re-established in a new country.^
The "reeve," or, for the shire, scire-gerefa. or shire-reeve, or, finally, sheriff, presided
over the meetings of the hundreds.^ It is the only Anglo-Saxon judicial office that survives
in any format.'* The term reeve applied in both public and private contexts. Wealthy

*Max Radin, Handbook o f Anglo-American Legal History. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West
Publishing Co., 1936), 31.
Tienry Adams, "The Anglo-Saxon Courts o f Law," reprinted in The Anglo-Saxon Law.
(South Hackensack, New Jersey: Rothman Reprints, Inc.), 11. Originally published by Little,
Brown, and Co., Boston, 1876.
^The relationship of the Shire to the hundred cannot be ascertained with certitude.
Generally, however, the shire seems to have been a superior political entity, bearing the
relationship to the more local hundreds that, later, a county court would bear to a justice
court.
‘‘Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order. (Washington DC.: Regnery Gateway, 1991),
181.
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landowners had reeves who collected rents and dues from tenants, and otherwise preserved
order on the estate. The term, therefore, connoted an officer vested with duly constituted
authority. O f all the reeves, the scire-gerefa was the most prestigious; his power stemmed
from the king's authority. Then, as now, the reeve o f the hundred, or the sheriff, had little
decision making authority. While the position survives to this day in policing districts, serving
process, and executing judgements, the sheriffs participation was critical at all stages of civil
proceedings in frontier Missoula County, to an extent that would surprise modern
practitioners.
The civil procedure in use held to a simple outline. A contemporary of Stephens,
Earnest Young, distinguished procedure in his time from the early German period. The
procedure of his day, thought Young, should be likened to a syllogism, in which the body of
judicial rules is the major, and the declaration o f facts the minor premise. That description
would satisfy any current practitioner as well. Continuing, Young argued that Germanic
pleading was not syllogistic at all, just an unstructured demand for compensation.^ From
there, ancient and modern litigants proceeded down divergent procedural paths o f proof,
which merged into substantially identical prayers for relief: both sought permission of the
court to proceed to execution.*

^Ernest Young, "The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure," reprinted in The Anglo Saxon Law.
(South Hackensack, New Jersey: Rothman Reprints, Inc., 1972), 3. Originally published by
Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, 1876.
*The words "prayer" and "execution" are used here in their legal sense. A prayer is the
portion of a complænt that specifies the relief requested. Execution, in civil procedure, is the
process by which the relief ordered by the court is carried out, as, for example, the seizure
and sale o f the defendant's property to pay the judgement.
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The gross distinctions, and the more subtle, yet profound, threads of continuity
between those "divergent procedural paths of proof provide the most interesting comparison
between ancient Anglo-Saxon law and the law of Missoula County. Whereas the courts of
Missoula County viewed proofs in terms o f modem conceptions o f evidence, the AngloSaxon courts envisioned something quite different. Nineteenth century courts focused on the
weight and veracity of testimony and documents (subject to supervening policy considerations
which exclude certain types of evidence or evidence obtained under disfavored conditions).
Anglo-Saxon courts, to the contrary gauged only the quality of oaths. The oath of an
aristocrat had more probative value, de jure, than that of a yeoman. As a result, Anglo-Saxon
evidentiary rules, unlike the rules of pleading, were actually more ritualized than modern ones.
The adduced proof was governed by severe formalistic strictures. Through the
scheduling of oaths, according to Young, "the community, perhaps for the first time, placed
their wills over the will of the individual."’ By that, he meant, the community began to
resolve the dispute in lieu of the parties. The essence of the judgment answered the question
o f who should provide oaths, and what they must contain.

This usually favored the

defendant, for if he could provide the requisite oath or oaths, he prevailed. In an action on
a debt, for example, the defendant needed only to provide, in effect, a sworn denial. The
power of the proof lay in the fact that the denial was in the form of the oath. No facts were
adduced to counter the plaintiffs claim. In an action for possession of movable property, the
defendant had to provide, beyond a denial of wrongdoing, evidence o f ownership.
The effortless administration of law in pre-conquest England was confounded by the

’Young, "The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure," 186.
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fact that cattle, a chief medium o f exchange, tended to wander. A strict principle held that
no title could be acquired in stolen property. Hence, more rigorous demands were imposed
upon the parties. Upon the defendant’s denial, the plmntiff had to attest to his own good faith
in bringing the action. In turn, the defendant's reply had to be accompanied by a pledge of
security.* Some passages in written laws specified the quantity of pledge.^ These last two
procedures were not only practiced in Missoula County, they were almost invariably relied
upon.
After the Norman invasion, a more sophisticated brand of feudalism took hold,
requiring a more sophisticated body of law for its administration. This required greater
proficiency of those who practiced law. Therefore, lawyers formed into organized bodies to
study the "law of the land," the common law of England. To convenience their studies, these
lawyers acquired properties, the "Inns," a word which then signified a private mansion rather
than a public accommodation.^® Little remains in the way o f description o f life in the Inns, or
their curriculum, except to say that "the mode of instruction was principally readings and
mootings.
Sir John Fortescue, nominal chancellor of Henry VI, threw some light on the picture,

*Ibid., 198-208. "A pledge of security" occurs where a party to a proceeding places
property at the court's disposal to redress violation o f an oath. Bail, to secure a criminal
defendant's appearance, is such a pledge.
% . Munro Chadwick, Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions, (New York: Russell &
Russell, 1905, 1963), 134.
^®John F. Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence o f England and America. (New York: Da
Capo Press, 1970), 42-3.
"Dillon, 52.
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particularly regarding the class o f young men attended.
In these greater inns a student cannot well be maintained under eight and
twenty pounds a year; and, if he have a servant to wait on him (as for the most
part they have) the expence is proportionably more: for this reason, the
students are sons to persons of quality; those of inferior rank not being able
to bear the expences of maintaining and educating their children in this way .*^
However, Wilfrid Prest's study demonstrated that the Inns did not limit attendance to
the sons of the aristocracy. Cost, not social ranking, barred the door. Prest concurred that
costs were imposing and included a fashionable wardrobe, fees to fencing masters and dancing
academies, and plenty of pocket money for gaming, drinking and plays. "[L]ike the proverbial
doors of the Ritz hotel," Prest said, "the Inns remained open to all sorts of men, rich and poor
alike, as long as they could foot the bill." In the end, the Inns were actually more exclusive
than the universities.^^
Wallace Notestein offered a fairly vivid impression o f the curriculum. Although the
Inns did not mandate a set regime, "there were moots, bolts, imparlances, putting cases, and
readings."^'* O f these, the moots elicited the greatest interest:
...their (the trainees) arguments were...criticized by older men, by Readers and
Benchers, perhaps by the Serjeant-at-law, or by a great judge who happened
to be in residence...Putting a case was a less formal procedure. As men were
at dinner or supper one of the older men might put a case and draw out those
at the table....Young men walking about the quadrangles were encouraged to

^^John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae. (Cambridge, 1825), as quoted in A.
Wigfall Green, The Inns o f Court and Earlv English Drama. (London: Humphrey Milford,
Oxford University Press, 1931), 33.
^^Wilfrid R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts. (London:
Hazell Watson & Viney Ltd, 1972), 27-32.
‘'‘Wallace Notestein, The English People on the Eve of Colonization. (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1954), 88.
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put cases to one another.. .Law, said Serjeant Maynard, was a babblative art;
men should study all morning and talk all afternoon.
Roscoe Pound denied that the education at the Inns could be properly called "academic," (an
attribute he found commendable.) Neither professors nor jurists comprised the faculty.
Instead they were practicing lawyers, "in touch with the law in action, seeking to develop the
common law of England as a workable system for meeting concrete problems of adjusting
human relations and ordering conduct."*^
But just as the Inns produced the law itself, they also served as foundries of the
profession o f law. Pound continues:
But what is significant for our present purpose is that the English lawyers at
the end of the Middle Ages had become a well developed, well organized
profession, maintaining a system of societies or associations promoting a
professional tradition, providing adequate training of those who were to enter

^^Ibid., 88-89. Prest provides an example o f an actual moot case, argued at the Middle
Temple in 1612.
"[A man has] a bastard elder son and a younger daughter who is within age. The
bastard dies having had issue. His father dies. The bastard's issue enters and grants a rent
charge. The grantee distrains and has the return irreplevisable’. The bastard's issue dies,
never having been interrupted in seisin. The daughter being within age, enters. The grantee
of the rent charge distrains upon the daughter. The daughter makes a rescue and the grantee
brings the assize.
The points;
1. Whether the issue of the bastard, being in without interruption, shall bar the woman who
is within age.
2. If such a judgement, that is to say when the grantee has the return irreplevisable', amounts
to a seisin upon which the other
can bring an assize." Prest, The Inns of Court. 108. (The question bears an eerie similarity
to modern bar exam hypotheticals.)
^^Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times. (St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1953), 92.
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the profession, and actively furnishing the development o f the law/^
Thus, by the time the of the British colonization of North America, a wealthy, elitist, and selfcontained legal profession had emerged/^
The Inns of Court made their impression upon colonial America. In the first instance,
early American trained lawyers, such as William Livingston in New York, came
predominantly from the Inns.^^ For a long time, training at the Inns of Court remained
singularly prestigious. Virginia, having forbade the practice o f law in 1645, by subsequent
statute (Act 16 of 1656) regulated admission and specifically admitted barristers trained at the
Inns of Court.^ In Maryland, membership in the Inns was the most prestigious entrance into
the legal profession, and, hke Virginia, such membership exempted the member from entrance
examination. Even Puritan Massachusetts saw three o f its men journey to the Inns before
1706.^^ The Inns' influence seeped continuously into America's emergent legal community.
Although lawyers took the lead in driving the colonies toward revolution, the Inns had served

^^Pound, 93.
**Prof Friedman says that "by 1600, English Lawyers were plainly professionals.. the bench
was recruited from the bar...Lawyers and judges made up a single legal community, with a
shared background and common experiences, as they do to this day. They were a cohesive
group sharply set off from the public." Lawrence Friedman, The History of American Law.
(New York; Simon and Schuster, 1973), 20.
^^Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 22.
'"Pound, 137-8.
' ‘John Murrin, "The Legal Transformation: Bench and Bar of the Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts," in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development. 3rd
Edition, Stanley Katz and John M. Murrin, eds., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973),
541-571, 549-50.
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to bind them to the mother country, holding the American elites to an English perspective.
After all, the Inns did more than offer professional training. Focusing entirely, as they did,
upon English legal institutions, English pleading, and English legal suppositions, they walled
lawyers off from Roman law and the "continental legal culture.
Although the law o f the Inns was English Common Law, it was certainly not common
in the ordinary sense of the word. First and foremost, the law taught at the Inns was the law
of land tenures (oddly, much the same law that tortures first year law students today). This
law, therefore, applied to the landowning elite; so did the pages of Lord Coke's reports, the
decisions studied by the law students. The venues of application were the royal central
courts. This, then, was the law for "lords and ladies, landed gentry, high ranking clergymen,
wealthy merchants...(t)he masses were hardly touched by this system.
For the rest of the people, the common law was the local, manorial law that governed
their daily lives, that maintained and serviced the feudal hierarchy that stretched in a fixed,
resplendent order from the child of the poorest tenant to God. The colonists imported this
body o f populist knowledge as well. It would be actualized in the daily workings of the
justices of the peace, whom Kermit Hall has described as "the lowest and most ubiquitous
layer of colonial legal institutions."^'* The justices themselves were usually lay persons, who
applied common sense and community standards to the cases that came before them.
Manuals such as Michael Dalton's Countrey Justice revealed how far this common law

^^Friedman, The History o f American Law. 20.
^^Friedman, The History o f American Law, 21
^'‘Hall, The Magic Mirror. 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

departed, in expression as well as subject matter, from the deeply arcane common law of at
the Inns.^* This populist tradition in American legal history has careened between humble
admiration and bitter disdain for its elitist brother.
Colonial America, despite great expenditure and artful posturing, never developed a
gentry that could rival England's. Still, such as did exist produced most of America's early
lawyers. Seventeenth century "lawyers" in Maryland were actually well-to-do planters and
merchants who dabbled in the law as occasion necessitated. When, after 1700, professional
lawyers (that is, persons who maintained a regular, extensive practice which provided their
principal means of support), began to appear in Maryland, they were drawn from these
privileged groups.^ Similarly, Milton Klein's study of the New York Bar confirms that, while
m earliest colonial times persons of common origins made up the rude practice, there would
later be no clear line with which to divide merchants or landlords from lawyers. By the mid
eighteenth century, the New York bar was controlled by men "organized to protect their
professional interest." The bar association was able to monopolize practice by obtaining from
the Supreme Court endorsement of its efforts to regulate admittance. In the years leading to
the Revolution, law became the career choice o f young men from the wealthiest families.
Aspiring lawyers obtained a baccalaureate degree, which had become a prerequisite for a
clerkship. There was, said Klein, "scarcely a prominent lawyer in the colony who was not

^^Michael Dalton, The Countrev Justice, reprinted in Stephen Botein, Early American Law
and Society. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 99-102. Dalton had studied law at
Lincoln's Inn in London (Botein, supra, 99 )
^^Alan Day, "Lawyers in Colonial Maryland 1660-1715," American Journal of Legal
History, Vol XVII, No. 2, 145-165 (April 1973), 149.
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related by ties o f blood or marriage to one of the great landed or mercantile families.

By

the Revolution, the profession in New York had achieved a separation from the community
which was a "source of pride.

Similarly, John Murrin's study of the colonial Massachusetts

bar confirmed that by the 1750s, the sons of some of the leading Boston families chose a
career in law.^ In 1762, Massachusetts Chief Justice Hutchinson ordered judges and lawyers
to wear English robes and gowns (a similar requirement obtained in New York two years
later).^ In fact, by 1750, in all major communities, "a competent professional bar, dominated
by brilliant and successful lawyers...existed.
The emergent legal professionals flexed their muscles aggressively.

Beyond

representing clients, they made public policy. This was so, Robert Bell has argued, because
the nature of the political process in American required their s k il ls .A s lawyers established
public policy, they alone understood the intricacies o f the law enacted to effect it. Lawyers
became officeholders, community leaders, even celebrities. In any community, the complex
issues were submitted to lawyers for solution, almost in the sense that eastern European

^^Milton Klein, "From Community to Status; The Legal Profession in Colonial New York,"
New YorkHistory; Ouarterlv Journal of the New York State Historical Association. (April,
1979), 134-156, 148-150.
28

Ibid, 156.

^ ^ u rrin , "The Legal Transformation: Bench and Bar of Eighteenth Century
Massachusettes," 555.
^‘^otein. Early American Law and Societv. 60.
^^Friedman, The History o f American Law. 84.
^^obert R. Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer: AHistorv 1735-1945. (London and Toronto:
Associated University Presses, 1992), 170.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

Jewish communities relied upon rabbis. Somehow, like the Eastern European rabbis, the
lawyers possessed a wisdom that transcended classification.^^ In some transcendent sense,
they knew how things worked. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the early nineteenth
century, "scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner
or later, into a judicial question.
Daniel Boorstin contended that the law seemed "interfused" with everything else in
the community and that "Americans saw the revered legal framework as the skeleton on
which the community had grown. "^^This description bears a moment’s contemplation. The
law had become so integral to society, so identified with the larger phenomenon called life,
that, at least according to Boorstin, it actually seemed as though the community developed
out of the law. What a stunning reversal! The entire theory underlying the presumed
legitimacy o f the common law was that it arose from common experience. Instead, by the
post-Revolutionary period, the law had a life of its own. The law carried society forward, and

^^If this analogy seems excessive, consider some of the rhetoric discovered randomly in
researching this paper; Bernard Schwartz called the Bar a "priestly tribe" fThe Law in
America, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); Daniel Boorstin called lawyers the "high priests"
o f the metaphysics o f property (The Americans: The National Experience. New York:
Random House, 1966, 416; Hall called the industrial lawyers o f the post-civil war era "the
'new high priests'" (The Magic Mirror, 225). Toqueville likened ante-bellum American
lawyers to the "hierophants of Egypt" (Alexis De Toqueville, Democracv in America, vol. 1,
289, edited by Philip Bradley, as quoted in George Dargo, Law in the New Republic. New
York: Knopf, 1983, 57.) In our own era, the rhetoric is actually understated. Priests, after
all, can only appeal to a higher authority. Modern lawyers are not expected to look beyond
themselves in solving perceived social ills.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1, edited by Phillip Bradley, as
quoted in Hall, 86.
^TJaniel Boorstin, The Americans: the Colonial Experience. (New York: Vintage Books,
1958), 204-5.
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not the other way around. The implications for the status of lawyers were great. Lawyers,
in the democratic era, became the "highest political class and the most cultivated portion of
society.
The implications for society, however, were far greater. If lawyers had assumed such
status and power, then, conversely, the other segments of society had correspondingly
diminished. As lawyers became the bones and not the flesh, to follow the metaphor, what
check could be placed upon them, what, besides self-discipline, could moderate their impact?
Fortunately, the greater community had one established line of defense: its historic mistrust
of lawyers.
Boorstin says that the anti-lawyer feeling gained renewed strength in early colonial
America.

In New England, puritan immigrants sought a legal system bound tightly to

scripture and freed o f the complexity of the common law. In Maryland, the Act of 1674
stated that "the good people o f this province are much burthened by lawyers." Until 1673,
there was no right to practice law in Massachusetts. Pennsylvania legislated simplicity in
pleading, a body blow to the development o f a legal community. As the profession became
more established, "(l)awyers, like shopkeepers, moneylenders, and lower bureaucrats (were)
lightening rods that draw rage during storms in the polity.

Rioters in New Jersey in 1769

^^Democracy in America, tran. Henry Reeve (2 Vols., Vintage ed., 1959), vol. 1, 288.
^^Boorstin, The Americans: the Colonial Experience. 197.
^*Friedman, The History o f American Law. 83.
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published pamphlets urging resistance to "this unconscionable set o f L—yers.

But Boorstin

noted a corresponding phenomena; respect for the law rose along with distrust o f lawyers
Writing on the colonial bar in New York, Milton Klein noted the
juxtaposition of conflicting themes: the bar's gradual rise to political and social
importance, paralleled by, and indeed resulting from, its increasing technical
competence, along with a steady growth in hostility from the laity
Boorstin's analysis separated law from lawyers. He saw the public as legally literate, and
therefore able to admire law but not lawyers. While the argument contained its own internal
logic, it was not very persuasive. It failed to explain Klein's observation that the profession
gained social prominence as it accrued public mistrust. The real reason for the parallel rise
in prestige and hostility was that the public both feared and respected the lawyers' secret trove
of knowledge. Like advanced military technology, the public feared and wanted it, the mix
varying against a changing social background.
The profession's prestige plunged after the Revolutionary War, manifesting lingering
anti-English attitudes. Lawyers were attacked during Shay's Rebellion and later, under the
influence of Jacksonian Democracy, as elitist and anti-democratic. During lean times, lawyers
were collected debts for impatient creditors and so became the point of attack for angry
debtors. The bar's ubiquitous bag o f legal technicalities was always the greatest irritant. "I
give my decisions on principles of common justice and honesty between man and man, and

^^erived from an anonymous broadside entitled "Liberty and Property Without
Oppression," as printed in Botein, Early American Law and Society. 124-126.
'‘“Boorstin, The Americans: the Colonial Experience, 205.
'“Martin Klein, "The Rise of the Legal Profession in New York," New York History.
April, 1979, 134-156, 137.
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rely on natural bom sense and not on law learning," said David Crockett, "I have never read
a page in a law book in my life.'"*^ No one could have said it better. Maxwell Bloomfield has
insisted that antilawyer sentiment before the civil war was a middle-class phenomena as well.
Merchants resented the high costs of litigation as their demand for legal services increased
with the growth o f the business economy."*^ According to Robert Bell, the ante-bellum
community in Philadelphia sensed a "conflict of interest" in the fact that the profession which
made the laws also profited from them.'*'*
Lawyers countered with a barrage o f propaganda designed to generate appreciation
of the legal profession. Publications sought to portray lawyers as hard-working, self-made,
even altruistic. In place of the aloof charlatan, legal publications drew an image of the
dedicated intellectual, the conscience of society.'*^ By the civil war, the legal profession was
broadly respected. Something more than propaganda accounted for this improvement in the
public image of lawyers; the profession had become more representative o f the society at
large.
Kermit Hall noted a trend toward social diversity as the nineteenth century wore on.
In the early years, the bar was "inbred," composed primarily of the sons o f prominent families.

"^Quoted in Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer. 91.
'‘^Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society. 1776-1876. (Cambridge
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 44, 138,
'*'*Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer. A History 1735-1945. 63. As the recipient o f an M.S.
in Taxation, I would venture the hope that the public will soon extend greater confidence to
this perception.
'•^Bloomfield, 144-147.
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By the Jacksonian era, however, entry restrictions had been eased and the bar experienced
greater middle class representation. "Diversity in the bar," Prof. Hall said, "was a by-product
of urbanization and in d u strializatio n .W h ile not directly attacking the democratization of
the bar. Pound traced efforts to ease admission standards to fear of legal elitism and the
Jacksonian faith in the "natural right of every man to pursue any calling o f his choice."
Additionally, and for Pound, quite dangerously, the nineteenth century pioneer ethos
celebrated versatility and deplored specialization. As a result, "the legal profession was
retarded and warped by the frontier spirit...(leaving) a mark upon our law and procedure
which we have been striving hard to erase in our present c e n t u r y . F r i e d m a n , echoing
Boorstin's theme, said that "the doors to the profession were at all times relatively open."
Moreover, "(t)he bar became a great avenue of social advancement" and the "vehicle through
which poor man's sons sometimes reached wealth and position.

The result was a stratified

bar. The young lawyer with lucrative connections had a shorter path to financial security.
As the century wore on, that path detoured through a law school.
Formal legal education had existed in the United States since the eighteenth century.
American law schools had developed organically out of law office instruction, as some
practitioners realized that a living could be obtained exclusively from taking in apprentices

'“Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror. 216. Prof Hall takes care to point out that in the South
the law remained insular until "well into the twentieth century."
'‘’Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times. 223.
'‘*Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times. 237.
‘‘Friedman, The History o f American Law. 266-7.
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under a relatively formalized regime. George Dargo identified some thirty-five law schools
which came into existence before 1835, most carrying the name o f the attomey-founder .^®
Law school education took its present shape after 1870, when Christopher Columbus
Langdell became Dean o f the Harvard Law School. Langdell initiated the case method of
study. Briefly, instead of listening passively to lectures, students were socratically grilled on
the contents o f selected cases. The underlying theory compelled more interest than the
method. Students were not being taught the tools of a vocation, they were being encouraged
to investigate the "science of law." Langdell's method implied, and his casebooks expressed,
the idea that the law was an accumulating body of scientific knowledge distilled from human
controversies, and stored in case reports. A central by-product was the enhancement of the
stature o f lawyers trained in the law schools. After all, students trained in the case method
were men of science. Langdell's methods greatly cleaved the divisions in an already stratified
profession.®^
Langdell's law replicated the law of the Inns. Dry, erudite, logical, it existed above
the push and pull of ordinary life. His methods produced learned opponents like Pound,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and more recently, Morton Horwitz. Lawyers trained in the case
method differed appreciably from the lawyers trained more traditionally by apprenticeship.
This latter method, called generally "reading the law," consisted o f copying out pleadings for,
and (ideally) under the supervision o f a practicing lawyer. Additionally, such lawyers read

®“George Dargo, Law in the New Republic: Private Law and the Public Estate (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1983), 51.
^‘Maxwell Bloomfield, The American Lawyer in a Changing Societv. 347; Jonathan Lurie,
Law and the Nation: 1865-1910 (New York: Random House, Inc., 1980), 64-5.
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legal treatises to obtain a general overview of legal principles. The purpose of such study was
not to perfect an appreciation of legal science. It taught lawyers how to get a defrauded
farmer's money back. In the place of science, logic, and erudition, there was form, procedure,
and result.
As with lawyers trained at the Inns in colonial times, lawyers trained in the case
method possessed the mantle o f authority. They occupied the elite wing of the profession.
Their practices changed in ways that reflected changes occurring generally in industrialized
America. Lawyers became more officebound and administrative. At the same time the
apprenticed lawyers disdained the treasure of impractical knowledge gained at the law
schools. As the elite bar specialized, the non-elite lawyers remained generalists. Giving
ground grudgingly, they took their strongest stand in the frontier regions of the nation.
E. Lee Shepard, in an article concerning new law practices in ante-bellum Virginia,
pointed out that a small clique of attorneys controlled the most profitable legal business.
The same could (and can) be said for the rest o f America. The more established lawyers
tended to congregate in commercial centers as, obviously, they still do. For the young lawyer
without impressive family connections, or, at least, an intimidating diploma, the frontier had
always provided the happiest hunting grounds. The frontier bar was educated "in the
courtroom, in the local inn, and by Blackstone."^^ Friedman describes its personnel as "quick-

Lee Shepard, "Breaking into the Profession; Establishing a Law Practice in AnteBellum Virginia," Journal of Southern History. Vol.48; No. 3, (August, 1982), 393-410, 407.
^G ordon Morris Bakken, Practicing Law in Frontier California. (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 22.
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witted adventurous young operators.
Tending as they do toward over-simplifications, such a picturesque descriptions may
obscure as much as they illuminate. Still, there are generalizations which are serviceable. By
and large, frontier practice was trial practice. Debt collection and quieting titles were the
chief stock in trade. Once an attorney had accumulated an arsenal o f forms, he seldom
needed legal research, as that term is understood today. A grasp o f the subtler, intangible
nuances of legal science was virtually useless. On the other hand, a quick wit and an engaging
oratorical style were powerful instruments. The client's case proceeded farther along the road
to victory when supported by a reference to popular literature, or the classics, or the Bible,
than by a case citation. This should not suggest that frontier lawyers were hucksters. No one
who actually studies the work product of frontier lawyers can fail to appreciate the sheer legal
skill they brought to bear upon the cases they presented, or their knowledge of and adherence
to procedure.
Among the young lawyers who set out from an urban center in post-bellum
America was William J. Stephens, o f County Dublin, Ireland, by way of San Francisco,
California. He went to a frontier community where social connections were unimportant and
where the competition was thin.

There, in Missoula, Montana, he personified and

encountered all of the influences which have been thus far catalogued.

*"*Friedman, 144.
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Chapter 2. William J. Stephens
Anyone seeking to write a biography of a minor actor in history must confront the
paucity of sources and materials. This is especially true o f William J. Stephens, who operated
in the American West during the frontier period. Concerning Stephens, and other peripheral
figures in Montana history, the main published sources, apart from newspaper stories, are a
series of "who's who" style compilations published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The editors o f these books would solicit biographical material from notable
Montanans, who, in turn, would provide the same in conjunction with money for the purchase
of the book. Thus, the editor obtained his profit. The contributor received primarily the
satisfaction of seeing his name and life story (and, for a larger fee, his picture or likeness) in
print. Apart fi"om the ego gratification, appearance in one o f these compilations was probably
good advertising, particularly in a state like Montana which had no indigenous aristocracy,
or, even, many native bom (white) residents. It goes without saying that the material
published in these books failed to meet the most modest test of critical historiography. Each
short biography was the writer's best impression of his own life, and nothing more. Still, if
some of the glowing phraseology is ignored, a body o f index information remains which in
most cases is reliable.
William J. Stephens appeared in three of these collections. He was introduced as an
"attomey-at-law, and ex-Judge of Probate, County Clerk, and Recorder o f Missoula County"
in History of Montana^^ as the "distinguished citizen and honored pioneer" in Progressive

^^Histoiy o f Montana. 1739-1885. (Chicago: Warmer, Beers & Company, 1888), 1318.
27
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Men o f the State of Montana^^: and as "a prominent member o f the bar" in The State of
Montana” . Other sources also mention Stephens, a truly accomplished and respected
attorney in Missoula County.*®
William J. Stephens was bom at Kingston, County Dublin, Ireland, on May 30, 1834.
His mother died during the birth. Stephens had three brothers and no sisters; at least he
mentioned none in any account he gave. He identified his father as Henry A. Stephens, whose
fatherly skiUs the younger Stephens did not describe ” Stephens did assert that he had "early
assumed the responsibilities of life."®" He attended public schools until he was thirteen years
old, at which time he went to sea. According to Progressive Men of Montana, he arrived in
the United States in 1847 and lived in Baltimore, Maryland until he learned of the gold strike
in northern California. He sailed out of Baltimore on a merchantman, around Cape Horn, and

^^Progressive Men of the State of Montana. (Chicago: A. W. Bowen & Co., 1910), 12545.
” Joaquin Miller, The State of Montana. (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Co., 1894), 3234.
*®I received a body o f documentation from Heather Hawley, Stephens' great-great
granddaughter, including interviews with her grandfather James Russell Hawley, bom 1902,
(Stephens' grandson through his daughter Eleanor) who, while still a boy, met Stephens.
Heather Hawley also provided me with an interview with her great-aunt Phyllis Turner (also
a suriving grandaughter of Stephens), and the written recollection of her other great-aunt,
Hope Hawley Ketcham (deceased) dated October 30, 1986. For convenience, the
aforementioned writted recollection is referred to as the"Ketcham recollection."
*^Stephens' Death Certificate names his father as "Edwin Stephens" (Washington State
Board o f Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Certificate o f Death Registered No. 4488.) As
Stephens provided the information to Progressive Men of Montana. I have selected that
account. Mrs. Margaret Stephens, Stephens' second wife, provided the Death Certificate
particulars.
^"Progressive Men of Montana. 1254.
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arrived in San Francisco in July o f 1850. He wasted only a few days in that city before
proceeding to the gold fields in the State's interior. After trying his hand as a miner for ten
days, he worked as a clerk in the general store of Curtis & Chase on the Tuolumne River for
one year, after which he engaged in placer mining for eighteen months, and accumulated
about $2,000.00 for the effort.®^ Stephens did not live the archetypal miner's life. Instead of
spending each day's take on hellraising, he invested his earnings in a grocery store in a
Tuolumne County mining town called Poverty Hill, where he worked for five years.
Heckendom & Wilson's 1856 directoiy describes Poverty Hill as follows:
This camp is situated five miles south from Sonora, in Tuolumne Co.
and adjacent to Campo Seco. It was first settled in 1850, by Wm. Utter, from
whom it first derived its name. It was subsequently changed to its present
name.
The camp is noted for its surface diggings which were formerly very
extensive...It consists of some five or six stores, and about thirty or forty
dwelling houses. There are also quite a number o f families settled in the
vicinity.^^
Stephens gave no reason why he thereafter returned to San Francisco, but he did say that "he
began to study law under Judge Townsend.
The Ketcham recollection varied somewhat fi’om that account. Hope Ketcham agreed

®^The information that he spent eighteen months mining at the general store on the
Tuolumne River, and one year thereafter in mining is from Miller's The State o f Montana.
This information varied fi*om that given in Progressive Men of Montana, which identified the
periods as one year in the general store and two years, thereafter, in mining. The Miller
account was published eight years earlier than Progressive Men of Montana. Because the
earlier account was closer in time to the actual events, I have relied on it for these particulars.
"Miners & Business Mens Directory for the Year Commencing January 1st, 1856",
Heckendom & Wilson, 87.
63

Progressive Men of Montana. 1254.
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that Stephens, whom she called "James," (Stephens' middle name) was bom in Dublin, but
added that his parents were English, who, moreover, were "upper class educated people."^
Ketcham confirms that he left home at thirteen years of age and took to the sea, but by her
account he headed for the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands.®* She said he sailed the South Seas
for three years, and, although loving the seaman's life, reflected, gravely one might presume,
upon "the class of people who made up the crews" He determined to "get a job and go back
to school.,(h)e knew he was going to be a mental man." So he left the ship in San Francisco.
Hope Ketcham's account indicated that he worked days and studied nights, inferentially in San
Francisco, becoming a lawyer in five years. She largely discounted his presence in the miners'
world, saying only that he "spent some time, it was short, at the California Gold field."
Hope Ketcham's impulse to recall her grandfather more readily as a hard working law
student, and less readily as a miner, is easily forgiven. But the accounts given the "Who's
who" publications during Stephens life must be credited. Additionally, extant documentation
attests to Stephens' presence in the fields upon an established basis. In 1850, Stephens

®‘‘An index of Irish names attributes several possible origins to the name Stephens,
including "planter English." This would support Ketcham's theory. Edward MacLysaght,
The Surnames of Ireland. Sixth Ed. (Dublin; Irish Academic Press, 1985), 279.
®*Very tangential and unintended support for the notion that Stephens arrived from Hawaii
or the South Seas was provided in the doctoral dissertation written by Raymond August.
Seeking to demonstrate that the law of the mining camps was Spanish in origin, August traced
the dissemination of news of the strike at Sutter's Mill in order to determine the origin of the
earliest prospectors who arrived from outside of California. These were mostly Hispanic
(especially Chilean and Mexican), but the news did reach Hawaii on June 18, 1848, nearly six
months after the discovery, but well in advance of the awakening in the Eastern United States.
The news trickled out slowly because crews in San Francisco deserted for the American River
area. Raymond August, Law in the American West: A History o f its Origins and its
Dissemination. ( PhD Dissertation, University of Idaho, 1987), 198.
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identified himself to A. W. Tuckett, the United States census taker, as a eighteen year old
"Miner".^ The "Miners (sic) and Business MEN’S DIRECTORY," published by Heckendom
and Wilson in 1856, contained a roster of residents of Tuolumne and other counties. The
Poverty Hill Directory identified "Stephens, W. J , Merchant, Ireland.

The 1860 Census

found Stephens in the Jamestown postal zone of Tuolumne County, having "variety store" as
an occupation, possessing $200.00 worth of real estate and $1,000.00 worth of personal
property. He had a clerk working for him named Lyman Mason.^*
By his own account, Stephens remained in Townsend’s office until 1861. From there
he went to another mining town, Virginia City, Nevada, where he continued to study law in
the office of Quint & Hardy (presumably fellow Irishmen) until 1864, at which time he was
admitted to the Nevada State Bar.®^ Stephens practiced briefly in Nevada and in 1865 moved

®®United States Census, Township N-2, Tuolumne County, California. Curiously, the
document is dated April 30, 1856. Stephens would have been sixteen in 1850, and, o f course,
twenty-two in 1856. Teenagers on their own are apt to exaggerate their age.
^’Heckendom & Wilson, p. 88.
^®United States Census, Township No. 3, Tuolumne County, 1860.
Jamestown was
apparently named after a Col. George Frederick James, who was the camp's "alcalde," a
Spanish administrative post held over for a time while American jurisdiction took hold. James
won the affection o f his neighbors by his "generosity with liquid refreshment" and his
gentlemanly ways. He was also an attorney who traveled the environs with a beautiful, young
Mexican lady he always called "la senora," together with a servant who dispensed cash. He
lived opulently, affecting the manners and dress of a Mexican hidalgo. However, James
proposed a joint venture with his neighbors which went broke. He left Jamestown in a hurray
for San Francisco. Carlo M. De Ferrari, "Summary Justice, The Way it Was, A short
Account o f the Gold Rush Alcaldes of Tuolumne County," (Senora, California: CHISPA
The Quarterly of the Tuolumne County Historical Society, Vol. 32, No. 3, Jan.-Mar. 1993),
1093-1112, 1094.
^^Stephens probably met Quint in Tuolumne County. Leander Quint appeared in the 1860
Federal Census for Tuolumne County as a Lawyer, claiming real estate valued at $9,000.00
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on to Idaho City, Idaho, where he practiced for about a year. Stephens thus had hitched his
star firmly both to fi-ontier and to mining towns. By this time, the center of prospecting action
had shifted to the what later became the State o f Montana.
No one knows precisely when gold was discovered within the present jurisdiction of
Montana. The missionary. Father Pierre De Smet, apparently knew o f the existence of gold
as early as the mid-1840's. Fearing disaster for his Indian converts, however, he kept the
knowledge to himself. In the late 1850s there were several minor discoveries. By the early
1860s, the fields in California, Nevada, Colorado, and Idaho were spoken for or spent; but
there existed, nonetheless, a large, seasoned, nomadic tribe o f American miners fascinated by
every rumor. In 1862, in response to a series of important discoveries (especially at Bannack
in July), the Montana rush got underway.™ More important for this story, mining had begun
in earnest along Gold Creek. This deposit was located about sixty miles east o f present day
Missoula, near the important Mullan Road, which connected ports on the Missouri and
Columbia Rivers. About twenty miles west of the Gold Creek site was another mining town,
Beartown, to which Stephens came in May of 1866.’^

and personal property worth $15,000.00. A history of the county disclosed that he eventually
moved to San Francisco, where he "gained a large practice and achieved honors." A History
of Tuolumne County. (San Francisco: B. F. Alley, 1882), 377.
™See Merrill G. Burlingham, "The Mining Frontier in Montana," in The Montana Past: An
Anthologv. edited by Michael P. Malone and Richard B Roeder, (Missoula: University of
Montana Press, 1969), 61-87; Michael P. Malone, Richard B Roeder, and William L. Lang,
Mnntana: A Historv of Two Centuries. Revised Ed. (Seattle and London: University of
Washington Press, 1976, 1991), 64,65.
’*The Ketcham recollection had Stephens going directly from San Francisco to Montana:
"I do not ever remember hearing what made him decide to take his knowledge of law and
horse to Montana but he did. Riding horseback from S.F to Billings I believe."
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Stephens stayed a year in Beartown, and from there removed about thirty miles
southeast (along the Mullan Road) to the town o f Deer Lodge. In the February 1, 1868
edition o f The Weekly Independent. Stephens advertised his services as an attorney:
"W. J Stephens
Attorney at Law.
Deer Lodge City, Montana
Will practice in all Courts of the Territory'
He remained in Deer Lodge for three years. During his second year there, he won election
as District Attorney o f the Second Judicial District, which comprised Beaver Head, Deer
Lodge, and Missoula c o u n t i e s . I n that capacity, he obtained the first convictions for first
degree murder in the history o f area which would become Montana. In 1869 he married Miss
Emma H. Lebeau, a native of St. Louis, Missouri. Ketcham related the meeting as follows:
James was practicing law at or near Deer Lodge, and had some business with
a Mr Thibault. So he rode out to Mr Thibault's house one beautiful spring day
morning. In those rather primitive days most people went to the main door
o f the house which was the kitchen door. Arriving at the door he beheld a girl
on her hands and knees scrubbing a wood floor with a strong scrubbrush
singing! She having her back to the door knew nothing of his approach, she
kept on singing. So he stood there for quite a few minutes watching her and
finally said to himself "that's the girl I'm going to marry. " He had settled it in
his heart before she ever knew he existed!
The Lebeau, or Thibault, or Tebeau, family had a colorful history. The family had come to

^^The Weeklv Independent (Deer Lodge, Montana), February, 1, 1868, p. 1.
^^In 1868, Stephens, running as a Democrat, defeated Republican Clitus Barbour in the
election for District Attorney. Stephens polled 1,381 votes to Barbour's 996. Historv of
Montana. 553. In 1869, Stephens again defeated Barbour, this time by a count o f 1788 to
1370. Historv o f Montana. 831.
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M ontana from St. Louis.

According to Heather Hawley (Stephens' great-great-

granddaughter), Emma's ancestors included a Parisian locksmith who came to Kaskaskia,
Illinois (a defunct community formerly located near St. Louis) after disembarking in New
Orleans in the 1720's’^. Another ancestor was a Spanish merchant who arrived in St. Louis,
then undeer Spanish jurisdiction, in the 1770's. The St. Louis Genealogical Society has
published a roster o f the Spanish militia of St. Louis in 1780. Members included Joseph
Alverez Hortiz, Emma's maternal great-grandfather.^* The same society also published an
index of Catholic marriages in St. Louis between 1774 and 1840. This identifies four Hortiz
marriages, the earliest being the aforementioned Joseph Hortiz' marriage to Marguerite
Bequet on February 1, 1780. The marriage of Joseph Thibault on April 10, 1804 is noted,
as is the September 14, 1833 marriage of Henry Thibault to Adeline Hortiz.’® Emma was the
issue o f the latter union. For these reasons, Ms. Hawley believes Emma's family name was
Thibault.
The June 19, 1868 edition of The Weekly Independent good- naturedly reported
Stephens' marriage.
For some time past, a young man firom Deer Lodge has been prowling around
this section o f country. What his business was no one could tell, but things
looked suspicious—something was wrong, but what it was no one could tell
until last Wednesday, when one o f the most daring robberies was perpetrated

’^Letter from Heather Hawley to Kenneth M. Wasserman dated January 26,1995.
’*"The Revolution in the Environs of St. Louis," published for the "Spirit o f '76 Fair," (St.
Louis: St. Louis Genealogical Society, 1972).
Catholic Marriages of St. Louis, Missouri 1774-1840", (St. Louis: St. Louis
Genealogical Society). Microfiche by the Genealogical Department of the Church of Jesus
Christ o f Latter-Day Saints, G.S. Call# 6048074.
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that it has ever been my duty to record. The invader has captured and will
carry off one of Missoula's fair daughters. I allude to the marriage of W. J.
Stephens Esq. to Miss Emma Lebeau, which took place at the residence of the
bride's father in Grass Valley.. ."Thad" stood the trying ordeal like a martyr.
No doubt his friends at Deer Lodge will be pleased to know that he was well
attended to, and that we endeavored to make his last hours as comfortable as
we possibly could. After supper was over, dancing commenced, and was kept
up without intermission until the light in the east warned us to desist.. .We
have concluded to let "Thaddeus" off, but if any more of you Deer Lodgers
attempt to run the blockade,—well, I won't say what we will do, tho' some of
the boys say they will retaliate. Hope they may.’’
Mrs. Stephens proved to be talented as well as fair. In 1877, at the Second Annual
Fair o f the Western Montana Agricultural, Mineral and Mechanical Association, she took
prizes for the best "specimen hand tatting," and best "white bed spread," together with a
special prize for the "prettiest baby."’*
Stephens was the junior member of the firm of Thornton, Robinson & Stephens when,
in 1870, the firm's office burned down, destroying its valuable library. Sensing opportunity
to the west in the grovdng community of Missoula, Stephens and his bride moved there in
December o f that year.’^
The town of Missoula originated in a manner typical o f many Western towns. Frank
Worden, a native o f Vermont, came to the Northwest where, in 1856 he became a clerk in
the Indian Department in the Washington Territory. He opened a general store in Walla
Walla with a Mr. Isaacs, who subsequently sold his interest to Christopher Higgins. Worden

77 '

Thff Weeklv Independent. (Deer Lodge, Montana), June 19, 1868, p. 3.

Missoulian. October 19, 1877. Ms Hawley states that hand tatting is "a difficult
type of needlework...a cross between crocheting and lacemaking" (letter, January 26, 1995).
History of Montana states; "W. J. Stephens came to Missoula and put out his shingle
in the fall o f 1870" (p. 860.) The December date is from Miller.
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knew the bureaucratic ropes in the Indian Department, and so he and Higgins obtained a
permit to trade with the Flathead Indians in what was then Washington Territory, later
Western Montana. In August of 1860, the two men, together with a pack train o f seventy-six
animals bearing merchandise, reached the Missoula Valley. They selected a site about four
miles west of the current downtown, between the Indian reservations to the north in the Jocko
Valley, and the Bitterroot Valley to the south. Additionally, the site was near the Mullan
road, handy for all east-west travelers needing provisions or refreshment. Earlier in the year,
men from Mullan's company had petitioned the Washington Territorial government for the
creation of a new county, since it took two days to ride to the county seat (Spokane County)
in Colville. In December, the territorial government created Missoula County, with the
County seat located at Higgins' and Worden's trading post.

In the following fall

(1861), gold mining activity increased along Gold Creek, and by the spring o f 1862, there
were plenty of new customers for the trading post owned by Higgins, Worden, and, by then,
Frank Woody. The settlement surrounding the trading post was called "Hellgate." The
discovery of gold in the Kootenai mines to the northwest in 1864 brought more customers
through Hellgate. In November of 1864, Higgins, Worden, and David Pattee built a sawmill
at the convergence o f Rattlesnake Creek and the Clark Fork River; a flour mill followed the
next spring. In fall 1865, Higgins and Worden moved the Hellgate store close to their mills,
and next door to the property where W. J. Stephens would commence practicing in Missoula
a few years later. The re-location of the store killed the small settlement at Hellgate; but just
as surely, it gave birth to the town of Missoula. Another gold strike in 1865, this time on the
Little and Big Blackfoot Rivers, intensified traffic through the settlement. On December 26,
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1865, Granville Stuart drew a sketch of the town, revealing thirteen structures.*” By 1869,
there were fifty structures "including a flour mill, two stores, two large hotels, two blacksmith
shops, two livery stables, a billiard room, sawmill, post office and several saloons."** On July
9, 1870, Episcopal Bishop Daniel Tuttle came to Missoula and wrote; "In Missoula and all
other towns, only the world, the flesh and the devil with many helps [sic] and the Holy Spirit,
unhelped are at work."*^ A month after Stephens' arrived, the town plot was drawn up, and
the town was officially surveyed.
Attorney Stephens hit the ground running. If he actually did take up residence on
December, 1870, then only a couple o f weeks passed before his first advertisement appeared
on January 5, 1871 in the Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer.*^ The Town o f Missoula was
quite proud o f its new resident:
We are pleased to state that Mr. W. J. Stephens, recently of Deer lodge City,
will hereafter practice his profession and become a permanent resident, in our
midst. Such additions to our community speak more for the future o f our
town than columns o f newspaper inducement. Mr. Stephens has resided in
Deer Lodge county since 1866. In his public capacity, as Prosecuting
Attorney of that County for several years, as well as in all the private relations
o f life, this gentlemen has made himself universally respected and esteemed.
Indeed, his record is so well known to our citizens, that it is superfluous to
say more than merely allude to his intention o f locating in Missoula.*'*

*”Along the bottom o f the sketch, Stuart wrote: "Sketched in 12 inches of snow.
Thermometer 34 below zero, hence not well finished."
**Lenora Koelbel, Missoula the Wav It Was (Missoula: Gateway Publishing & Litho,
1972)33.
*"Koelbel, 35.
" The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer. January 5, 1871, p. 1.
" The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer. December 29, 1870; p. 3.
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Upon completion o f the new courthouse in June, 1871, the town held a ball celebrating the
dedication. Reporting upon the event. The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer identified the
notable attendees, including "the madonna-like Mrs. W. J. Stephens and other ladies of the
elite o f Missoula society."**
Mrs. Stephens' new found celebrity was not diflBcult to understand. Her husband later
reported to Progressive Men of Montana that he had found in Missoula "a large and valuable
clientage."*^ Stephens' account to Miller's The State of Montana afBrmed that "there was a
great deal o f legal business over land and mining claims," and that "from his arrival in
(Missoula) Judge Stephens enjoyed a large and remunerative practice."*’ Further evidence
of Stephens' success appeared in the May 25, 1872 edition of the Pioneer, which reported that
Stephens was building a home:

Mr. W. J. Stephens is putting up a substantial residence about one mile below
town and informs us that he has a nice lot o f fruit trees on the premises which
are growing finely. Have you got a watermelon patch? Them's our kind o f
fruit.*®
Stephens was not alone—Montana was booming.
Stout's Montana,,Jts Story and Biographv has this to say about legal practice in
Montana during this period:

**The Missoula Pioneer. June 22, 1871, p. 3.
*^Progressive Men of Montana. 1255.
*’Miller, 323,
**The Pioneer. May 25, 1872, p. 3. The phrase "below town" meant to the west, i.e. down
river.
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But though the fees were large, the lawyers, seemed to think the supply
inexhaustible....For the number of people in the territory the litigation was
very large, owing to the disputes and conflicts concerning mining claims and
the appropriation of water; and it is not too much to say that the bar o f this
period was equal to that of any other country. Notwithstanding the expense
and difficulties of transportation, they had fine libraries, and when occasion
required would ship large numbers of books at the rate o f twenty-five cents
per pound to remote countries, to be used there in the trial o f cases.*®
The same account went on to describe the business before the Montana Territorial Supreme
Court during the terms o f August, 1871 and 1872. After describing the cases and decisions
during the latter term, the text proudly praised the skills of certain lawyers:
It is said that "the briefs and arguments of counsel at that term, for
learning and ability, have never been surpassed in the territory or State of
Montana, and would have added dignity and strength to any bar in the
country; and if the opinions and decisions o f the judges were not sound and
able, the fault was not with such lawyers as E. W. Toole, W. F. Sanders,
Claggett and Dixon, Sharpe and Napton, Chumasero and Chadwick, Joseph
K. Toole, Shoper and Lowry, Henry N. Blake, Samuel Word, James G.
Spratt, Henry L. Warren, George G. Symes, W. E. Cullen, W. J. Stephens and
United States District Attorney Cornelius Hedges." (emphasis added)®^
Notwithstanding Stephens billing near the bottom of the list, his mention among the elite
lawyers of the territory strongly inferred that his legal skills were well regarded. In a few
short years, Stephens would be able to add minor military honor to his growing reputation.

During the summer o f 1877, Missoula was threatened during the Nez Perces War.
With the nearest telegraph 60 miles away in Deer Lodge, Missoulians had little warning that
Chiefs Joseph, Looking Glass and White Bird, along with eight hundred followers were

*®Stout, Montana Its Story and Biographv. (Chicago and New York: The American
Historical Society, 1921) 421.
^Ibid., 421-2. The internal quotation is not attributed.
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heading up the Bitterroot Valley, southwest o f Missoula. A company was organized to
defend the town, and Stephens was designated Lieutenant. On about July 25 news came that
an advance guard o f Chief Joseph's band had reached Lolo. By this time, the white military
strength, including the company from Missoula, had grown to about five hundred men. The
Missoula contingent included about forty regulars from Fort Missoula. After Chief Joseph
passed within three-quarters o f a mile o f the contingent's entrenchments, he turned up the
spur of a mountain and thereby avoided a skirmish. The white companies moved as well, and
when they arrived at the Bitterroot, the soldiers and volunteers from outside the area went
home, to the dismay o f the Bitterroot settlers, who were still in danger. There was, according
to Amos Buck, "one exception" to the shameful dispersal: "Judge W. J. Stephens came on
up the valley with us and remained with us until he found that no harm was to come to us
from the Indians we had been out to fight.

Stephens star continued to rise. In 1878

he was a candidate for clerk and probate judge and was elected to the county Democratic
central committee. In 1883 he was elected County Clerk and ex-ofFicio Probate Judge. That
year, Mrs. Stephens obtained notoriety in her own right.
According to the newspaper account, Stephens worked late on the night o f Thursday,
April 18, 1883. Around midnight, Emma Stephens, at home with the children, heard someone
attempting to enter the house. When Emma warned the intruder, he gave a mocking reply
and continued trying the doors and, even, the windows of the house. Thoroughly alarmed,
and knowing one entrance was not secured, Emma blindly fired two guns through the

^^Amos Buck, "Review of the Battle of the Big Hole", Contributions to the Historical
Qnqptv of Montana. Vol. 7 (Helena: Montana Historical and Miscellaneous Library, 1910),
117-120.
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window.

She heard no more, and concluded that she had succeeded in frightening the

trespasser off the grounds. The next morning, the hired man informed her that a dead man
lay at the back gate.
The dead man was Jonnie Baker. He had arrived in Missoula on the 17th of April, and
had stabled two horses with C F. Ledge & Co. The Missoula paper said he was a "hardened
sinner" who had been "ordered out of Deer Lodge not a great while ago. " The coroner's jury
quickly found that the homicide was justifiable.^^

By 1884, Stephens' official duties,

together with the demands of his practice, led him to form a partnership with a young attorney
named William M. Bickford. Stephens' business ventures and investments grew apace. By
1887 he and Bickford, now collaborating in real estate ventures as well, had purchased sizable
blocks o f property south of the river. They planned to found a new city. South Missoula, for
which they plotted streets running parallel to the wagon road to the Bitterroot. The wagon
road ran southwest, thus South Missoula's streets ran diagonally to the section lines. Judge
Hiram Knowles last minute maneuvers effectively checkmated Stephens' plan, but the streets
he proposed exist today, a half mile square island o f streets running diagonally to those in the
rest of the city. Even longterm residents find the zone baffling.^^ Stephens and Bickford took
on another partner, Frank Higgins (Christopher Higgins' son) in 1887. By then, Stephens’
other business interests had taken over his attention, and he retired in 1889.
He continued to appear in the city directory advertisements place by Stephens, Matts,
and Denny (a law firm), but just below that ad, his own appeared, as follows:

92TbA Weeklv Missoulian. April 20, 1883, p. 3.
«Koelbel, 68.
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W. J. STEPHENS,
MISSOULA,

-

- MONTANA.

I make land entries of all kinds.
I keep correct plats of Government Lands.
I loan money on final proofs made at my office.
I loan money on improved farms.
Borrowers can get their money on the very day they apply.
I keep abstracts o f title to all real property.®"*

In retirement, Stephens enjoyed the financial benefits accruing naturally from a
productive life. Unfortunately, as his career wound down, his marriage to Emma was
imploding. On June 3, 1894, he filed for divorce, alleging that his wife had deserted him the
previous May, and further alleging (presumably in support of his request for custody of the
three children who were still minors) bizarre, violent behavior on the part o f his wife. The
court appointed a referee to take testimony and report. The referee was Elmer Hershey, a
partner in Bickford's new firm. Hershey took sworn testimony on August 14 and 15 of 1894.
After her attorney filed an unsuccessful demurrer, Emma did not again appear. Stephens, and
five of his children, however, did. The five were four of the adults, the other adult child being
married and in Seattle. Adeline, a fifteen year old minor, also testified. From each account,
Emma, the same "Madonna" who graced the ball commemorating the new courthouse in
1871, emerged as a dangerously dysfunctional adult.

^^Wrisht & Woodward's Missoula Citv Directory, 1890, p. 231.
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Stephens testified that his wife had twice attempted to leave him before effecting the
final break. In 1890, he took her to the West Coast in an attempt to revive the marriage.^^
The trip, he concluded, made matters worse. They returned on the last day of 1891, and took
o f residence in the Florence Hotel. Emma's spirits continued to decline, and she began
demanding money with which to leave him. She began consorting with a woman possessed
of a shabby reputation and refused to desist. To no avail, Stephens urged her to allow him
to build a new house for the family. She said that "if I [Stephens] had a spark o f manhood
I wouldn't want to live with a woman who hated me."
In May of 1893, Emma abandoned the Hotel and went to live in Seattle with the three
minor children. Stephens made two trips to urge her return. During the second, in the spring
of 1894, the children were allowed to select the parent with whom they preferred to live.
Stephens returned in May with the three minors and filed shortly thereafter.
He testified to disturbing incidents in she which attacked him with deadly implements
("she rushed in like a maniac with a carpenter's hammer , and aimed a blow at my head"),
cursed him frequently, and spat in his face during the most minor disagreements. Stephens
denied marital relations ("cohabiting") over a period of years. Referring to Alice Marguerite
Stephens, born May 27, 1890, Emma suggested the child was not his.
Harry A. Stephens, the twenty-six year old eldest son, confirmed his father's version,
including the violence, the abusive language, and the absence of provocation. Asked by
Hershey which o f his parents was best fitted to care for the minor children, Harry replied "the

®*The file in another matter, Stephens v. Conant, Case No. 180, reveals that they had gone
to California.
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plaintiff is. Defendant often treated the minor children cruelly without cause."
Adeline Stephens, aged fifteen, confirmed the desertion, and added that, while in
Seattle, Emma had introduced her to a "young man" as her sister. Laura Buckley, the parties'
twenty-four year old married daughter, also confirmed the desertion. She told how Emma
had, "fully a hundred times," said she hated Stephens, and that she "did not want an old man
like plaintiff tagging after her." Laura confirmed the spousal abuse, saying that Emma had
an uncontrollable temper, and indulged in rages during which she actually "would foam at the
mouth" (Stephens testified to the same phenomena). Laura continued, saying that Emma
"scoffs at religion...She has said just because one was married to one man is no reason why
one must be true to him." Lastly, she related a singularly bizarre incident in which Emma
invited her daughter Eleanor's fiance into the bathroom while Eleanor was bathing.
Nineteen year old Alexander Stephens also confirmed Stephens' account. Hershey
asked him;

"Is it more than probable that a young child would suffer physically from

defendant's temper?" Alex replied: "With her temper it would be more than probable that
they would get knocked down with a club." Lawrence Stephens also testified on behalf of
his father.^ Hershey's report stated that Emma was not "a fit or suitable person to have the
care and custody o f said minor children." The Court, not surprisingly, granted the divorce
and awarded custody to Stephens.

^^W J. Stephens vs. Emma H. Stephens. Case No, 1066.
^’The Ketcham recollection is much kinder to Emma. She is there described as a
fastidiously neat woman, affectionate with her granddaughter, the writer. Still, "grandma's
temper" rates numerous anecdotes.
In February of 1995, Stephens great-great granddaughter. Heather Hawley, conducted
tape recorded interviews with two of Stephens' surviving grandchildren, James Hawley and
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Emma Stephens remained in Seattle. On February 21, 1898 she married Michael
Andrew Reid, who was identified as a "mariner" in the Seattle phone directory of 1918. The
family lore includes the story that while Stephens and Emma were in California in 1890, in an
effort to resuscitate the marriage, they took a voyage. Reid was the Captain. Emma heard
his voice and fell instantly in love.^* The 1930 Directory identified Reid as a janitor. The
Ketcham recollection indicates that Emma's (or "Aimee") second marriage was happier than
her first. She died in the early 1930's.
For the reminder o f his career, Stephens managed his investments and engaged in the
land business. In 1896, he sued Bickford over the disposition o f profits from their law and
real estate businesses. This was his lowest hour. He accused Bickford of failing to account
and misappropriating partnership funds. Like the Stephens divorce, this case was assigned
to a Referee Although represented, Stephens conducted most of the examination of Bickford
by himself. Stephens mean-spiritedly badgered his former protege about minor affairs. Aside
fi'om some minuscule inadvertences, however, he failed to establish any serious wrongdoing.
The Referee found for Bickford.^

Phyllis Turner. Both are the issue o f Stephens' daughter Eleanor. Phyllis Turner echoed
Ketcham's description o f a hellcat with a soft heart; "I was scared to death of her...When they
[Emma and her second husband Michael Reid] would come [we would ask] may we take
your coat' [and Emma would reply] T'll take my coat off when I get good and ready'. ..but she
would always say to Mr. Reid give the girls a dime.'" James Hawley had only positive
memories. Emma knew her grandson's affection for french fries, and "always had a pot of
deep fat on the back o f the stove ready to go" when, as a boy, he visited.
Ms. Phyllis Turner remarked that "Mr. Reid worked for the Alaska Steamship
Company" and that he, Reid, "did have a nice, soft, resonant voice. " Interview with Heather
Hawley, February, 1995.
J Stephens vs. Walter Bickford. Case No. 1291.
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Stephens served as Missoula's Democratic representative in the Fifth Legislative
Session o f the Montana House of Representatives (January 4 to March 4, 1897) and the Sixth
Legislative Assembly, (January 2 to March 2, 1899)^^. In Polks 1903-4 city directory,
Stephens appeared as "President o f the Missoula County Abstract Co. and attorney at law."
In the 1911 directory, the listing for Stephens specified only his address ("Apt D The
Bowland"), omitting any reference to any vocation. The 1915-16 directoiy included the
following; "Stephens Wm J, moved to Los Angeles, Calif.
The Ketcham recollection is the only source for his later years (excluding his death
certificate and death notices). A granddaughter's memories, it focuses upon his personal
rather than his professional life. It stated that:
Grampa lived single for years after the divorce...finally in old age he caught
pneumonia ...his doctors advised him to go to Calif...(h)e loved Santa Anna
[sic] so at his doctors [sic] advice took one o f the nurses with him...
Suddenly, he appeared, together with the nurse, at his daughter Eleanor's home in Seattle.*”^
He took up residence at the Calhune Hotel. His other daughter, (Alice) Marguerite, visited
him a few days later and learned that he had married the nurse. According to Marguerite, as
relayed by Hope Ketcham, the nurse threatened to leave Stephens if he did not marry her,
saying that otherwise her reputation would be ruined. Something else was ruined instead: the

^““Ellis Waldrom, Montana Legislators 1864-1979. Profiles and biographical Directory
(Missoula: Bureau o f Government Research, University of Montana, 1980), 139.
' “' R L Polk & Co^SLMissoula and Hamilton City Directory and Missoula and Ravalli
Coiintv Director/ 1903-4 (Helena: R L Polk & Co.), 198; Polk Directory for 1911, p. 282;
Polk Directory for
1915-16, p.245.
^“^The nurse's name was Margaret, not to be confused with Stephens' daughter Marguerite.
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expectations of Stephens' heirs.
Shortly after, he fell ill again. Marguerite visited and, again, according to Marguerite
as relayed in Hope Ketcham's recollection, Stephens suggested that his bride was poisoning
him. Then he quickly recanted, admitting a suspicious nature. "Well," Ketcham said, "two
days later he was dead."^**^ Moreover,
I and the rest o f the family were too dumb to be suspicious for quite a long
time. But when we learned that in the 3 months of their marriage she had
converted over all o f his property into other property , trades and sales, she
purchased a large block in the Olympic Hotel place, two other very good
hotels here in Seattle & sold the tide flat acreage, everything except on the
copper mine in Montana which he had purchased as a working mine and
closed to be sure to leave at least that to his children...
The family, all branches were so poor those days and copper so cheap Mom
& her sisters and brother just let her get away with it. They said, to fight it
was throwing money away on a very uncertain future.
Something of Stephens' legal acumen had remained in the family.
Stephens died June 5, 1918 at his home at 943 Twenty-fourth Avenue, in Seattle,
survived by his wife Margaret, and eight children.
Stephens place in Montana history is peripheral, but his memory is esteemed by his
family. James Hawley, his grandson, recalled that Stephens was a "prominent man, highly

‘“Ketcham recollection. Phyllis Turner heard the rumors as a girl; "he did write a letter
to somebody saying he was being poisoned. He was afraid he was being poisoned by the
nurse that was taking care of him...he was sure he was being poisoned." James Hawley was
disdainful when reminded of Ketcham's accusation: "Sounds like my sister putting the worst
possible interpretation on
the motives...It seems to me a perfectly logical sequence that some woman who took good
care o f him and fulfilled his needs in his old age [might be entitled to the inheritance]."
(Interviews conducted by Heather Hawley)
lo-'Thm Seattle Post-Intelligencer. June 6, 1918.
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respected." Phyllis Turner, a granddaughter, recalled that as a young girl she had been "quite
in awe o f the fact that my mother's father was a judge.
"I had always heard," said Heather Hawley, Stephens great-great granddaughter, "that
one o f my ancestors was a Judge in frontier Montana—he was always spoken o f with
respect.
That seems only fair enough.

^^^Interviews conducted by Heather Hawley.
^“^Letter from Heather Hawley to Kenneth M. Wasserman, February 27, 1995.
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Chapter 3. The Early Practice: A Procedural Focus

The first impression o f Stephens' practice is that it parallels the assessments made of
some of the more notable frontier lawyers, such as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and
Abraham Lincoln. Freink Dewey, also a lawyer, did an analysis o f Jefferson's eight year legal
career and concluded that, while a colonial Virginia lawyer might draw an occasional deed
or will, "being a lawyer in those days meant being a trial lawyer.

Similarly, James W. Ely,

Jr.'s study o f Andrew Jackson's practice confirms that "Jackson devoted most of his time to
trial w ork . .[0]ffice work, such as drafting deeds and wills, was seemingly not a major
activity for Jackson.

John P. Frank said of Lincoln:

At all times, Lincoln was first and foremost a trial and appellate lawyer. His
was not the business of incorporating banks or railroads, or drafting contracts,
or arranging sales o f property. He was a litigation man.^^
The sheer volume of Stephens' court work strongly infers that litigation occupied the bulk o f
his time.
In the first book of the Register of Civil Actions, Second District, Stephens appeared
in fully 201 of the 456 actions filed between 1868 and 1878.^^“ Before moving to Missoula,

^“^Frank L Dewey, Thomas Jefferson. Lawyer (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1986), 1.
James W. Ely, Jr., "The Legal Practice o f Andrew Jackson" Tennessee Historical
Quarterly. 421-435, 430.
^“^John P. Frank, Lincoln as a Lawyer (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1961), 6.
“ ®The word "appear" may seem over used in the text, but as it has a specialized legal
meaning it is the proper word. When a lawyer "appears," he has formally undertaken a client's
representation in a specific (court) case. A lawyer usually appears initially by signing an initial
49
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he appeared in 9 of the 72 actions filed before December o f 1870; afterwards he appeared in
198 out o f 384—an astonishing 51.6%. And clients had many lawyers from which to chose.

This chapter presents a procedural analysis o f the law practiced in Missoula County
in the 1870s. Where appropriate, it will reflect upon procedural differences and similarities
between practice in frontier Missoula and Anglo-Saxon practice, and between frontier
Missoula and current practice.
Stephens had litigated in Nflssoula County prior to moving there. His first appearance
was as co-counsel with Joseph Rand on behalf of The Territory of Montana and the County
of Missoula vs. The Hudson Bay Company. The Territory and the County contended that the
defendant had done business outside of the Flathead Indian Reservation without a license,
which the defendant denied. On October 2, 1867 Stephens and Rand filed a replication to the
defendant’s answer, and, concurrently, a Motion to Strike Out a Portion of Defendant's
Answer.“ ^ Functioning as "W. J. Stephens District Attorney Second Judicial District," he
prosecuted Charles Cuissin and Janice Gugwaith for adultery on behalf of the Territory."^
On the eighteenth of October 1868 he appeared alone on behalf of Defendant A. H. Tebeau,

pleading.
“ ^1, 289. Reference is to transcript and page number, respectively, of the Register of Civil
Actions of Missoula County.
A "replication" is a reply to an answer. Briefly, a
lawsuit begins with the presentation of a grievance in the proper form. This is formally called
the "complaint." The party sued, the defendant, files a written response, usually a refijtation
called an "answer." Occasionally, the complaining party responds to the answer, in a
document called a replication.
"21, 313-4.
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denying that "Said (L. J. Demers) plaintiff is entitled to the possession of nineteen milch cows
or Sixteen Calves Known as the Jack Demers Calfes or four milk Buckets or Sixty milk pans
or either or any of the above chattels," and alleging affirmatively that his client's possession
was lawful, resulting fi'om "an agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant on the
5th day of April 1868. " The case was settled and dismissed upon the plaintiffs payment of
$67.00 in costs.

When W. J. McCormick sued David Driscol for "11 oz. 2(?) and 6 Grns

of merchantable gold at $18 per ounce ...for flour sold and delivered to defl. at his Special
instance and request," Thornton, Robinson & Stephens appeared for Driscol on June 14,
1869. Driscol's counsel specifically denied McCormick’s claim, affirmatively alleged failure
of consideration ("said flour was not good or merchantable or of the quality represented"),
cross-claimed for labor performed, and, finally, alleged that the plaintiff was not the real party
in interest.

W. J. Stephens duly witnessed Driscol's mark, "X", enabling Driscol to verify

the answer.
Thornton, Robinson & Stephens also represented Defendant O. W. Squires, filing
their initial pleading December 14, 1868.“ ^ This was the law firm Stephens would later
identify as the one he left when their office burned down, and thenceforth went to Missoula.

*'^1,405-10. There is reason to believe that Stephens was representing one of his in-laws
in this matter. See pages 35-36.
“ '‘An answer to a complaint almost invariably serves to deny the plaintiffs grievance. If,
as often happens, the defendant not only denies the complaint but also alleges some fact in
his or her favor (in this example that the flour purchased was of unacceptable quality), that
allegation is called an "affirmative allegation," because it is more than a mere denial.
“ M, 548-550.
"^1, 579-82.
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Stephens last case in Missoula County, while still residing in Deer Lodge County, was in his
capacity o f District Attorney for the Second Judicial District. In it, he represented the
Territory against Jane Kirkham and B. Kirkham. One M. B. Harris had been arrested for
assault with intent to kill, and had made and jumped bail; the case Stephens prosecuted in
Missoula was against the two Kirkhams as sureties on the bail bond.‘^^ The People of the
Territory o f Montana were in good hands, at least when wrongdoers ventured into the
Second District.
While the above cases provide solid amusement, containing as they do a travelogue
o f local color surrounding litigation on the American frontier, those cases and the ones
following also provide a compelling picture of the legal procedure then in use. Though it is
surprising to see an unrelated cross-claim inserted between a substantive and a procedural
affirmative defense in the same pleading, a modem lawyer would find none o f the procedures
employed by Stephens' abstruse or even unfam iliar.M oreover, if the procedures employed
by W. J Stephens and his contemporaries anticipated those o f the late twentieth century, it
is also fair to point out that they reflected shadows cast in King Alfred's day, and before.
The first, glaring facet of nineteenth century procedure that reflected ancient Anglo-

" " 1,

711 - 13 .

"*See the Driscol case, above.
A "cross-claim" is a subsequent complaint entered in a lawsuit. For example, a
defendant may have a grievance against the plaintiff, or a related grievance against a third
party. These would be plead as a "cross-complaint." A modern practitioner would have filed
Driscoll's answer, which would include any affirmative defenses, in one document, and the
cross-complaint (usually filed concurrently with the answer), in another.
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Saxon law was the use o f verified pleadings."’ As described in Chapter 1, the early AngloSaxon defendant, duly summoned, entered his denial under a rigorous oath. The plaintiff
countered with an oath of his own. In Stephens' Missoula County, all pleadings were verified
before a notary public. The format o f the verification was nearly identical to that used in
modem courts, for example:
Territory o f Montana
County of Missoula
Philippe Reuss
being first duly sworn deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in the above
entitled Cause that he has heard read the foregoing complaint and knows the
contents thereof and that the same is true o f his own knowledge except as to
the matters therein stated on information and belief and as to those matters he
believes it to be true.'^’
The answer was also sworn. Stephens often verified pleadings on behalf of his clients,
declaring "that he is the atty o f Defendant in the above Cause that he (Stephens) has heard
read the foregoing answer...and that he has reason to believe that the matters therein stated
are true."'"
Modem lawyers, under more proscribed circumstances, may also verify pleadings on
behalf o f a client, but are extremely reluctant to do so, having a sharper eye towards their
professional liability. More important, verified pleadings are nowadays required only in
extraordinaiy causes, such as pleas for injunctive relief, and expedited matters such as

" ’A "verified pleading" is a complaint or answer to which is affixed the party's sworn
declaration that the alleged facts are true. Thus, where a complaint or answer which has been
verified contains an alleged fact which the party knows, or reasonably should know, is false,
that party is liable for perjuiy.
'^2, 116.
*^'See, for example, 3, 309-10, L ew vs. Shav.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

unlawful detain er.L aw y ers now prefer to avoid verifications in the pleading stage because
they do not want to tie their clients to one set or description of the facts; rather, they wish to
preserve as much room to maneuver as possible for as long as possible.

True, legal

proceedings were less under God's nose in Stephens' day than in Alfred's; evidence, not oaths,
constituted the real essence of litigation. At the same time, the survival o f the oath at the
pleading stage in Stephens' time, and its demise in our own, indicates that lawsuits are now
easier to commence, and that the truth is now less o f a barrier to nonmeritorious suits.
Another similarity between the litigation format practiced by Stephens and the pre
conquest Anglo-Saxons is the imposition o f prejudgment remedies. In modem litigation,
prejudgment attachment (court ordered seizure of the subject matter of the suit before
judgment) is a form of extraordinary relief. It is "extraordinary" because the court orders a
seizure of the property in question before there has been a trial. Obviously, such a procedure
offends ordinary notions of due process—the defendant has his property seized by the sheriff
before he has even had a trial, let alone lost the case. The plaintiff must make a strong
showing of necessity for immediate seizure, beyond mere entitlement to possession. The
plaintiff must show, for instance, that the defendant is about to secrete the property in issue,
or dispose o f it, or abandon the jurisdiction.
In Stephens' day, however, the plaintiffs counsel routinely obtained a writ of
attachment concurrently with the issuance of the summons. Moreover, there was no separate
hearing on the attachment, merely an affidavit and a surety bond. The affidavit had requisite

such cases, the courts must make relatively rapid determinations affecting rights and
property; therefore the danger inherent in frivolous allegations is exponentially greater.
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elements: that the claim was upon a contract for the payment of money, that no security had
been provided, and that the attachment was not sought to vex legitimate creditors of the
defendant (that is, the attachment was not part of a collusive scheme between the plaintiff and
defendant). For instance, when Joseph Lamoureaux sued Clement Lamoureaux, claiming an
indebtedness of $949.08, Stephens, representing Lamoureaux, applied for a writ by affidavit
dated July 13, 1871 alleging that the debt was
upon an express or implied contract for the direct payment of money in the
Territory o f Montana...(for which) payment has not been secured by any
mortgage or lien or pledge upon any real or personal property that it is a
bonafide existing debt due and owing from the defendants to this plaintiff that
this action is not brought nor is the prosecution of attachment sought to
hinder or delay or defraud any creditor or creditors o f the defendants.
In another case, the plaintiffs, T. J. Demers and Wm. McWhirk executed a surety
bond, declaring themselves to be "jointly bound to the defendants in the above entitled cause
in the sum o f $1894.16/100 Dollars to the payment of which sum will and truly to be made
bind ourselves our heirs executors administrators and assigns jointly [sic]..." should defendant
be damaged by the attachment and prevail, and that each affiant was worth the sum of the
bond.^^'* The next day Judge Hiram Knowles issued a Writ o f Attachment, filled in upon a
preprinted form, confirming that "the necessary affidavit and undertaking herein having been
filed as required by law" and commanding the sheriff to "attach and safely keep" nonexempt
property belonging to the defendants "unless the defendant give you security, by the

^^2,

1010 .

^^^hese bonds are still required in these circumstances, and for the same reasons. Since
the defendant is being dispossessed before trial, he has a right to compensated for losses
occasioned by the attachment should the attachment subsequently be proven to have been
unwarranted.
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undertaking o f at least two sufficient sureties, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such
demand.

The SheriflF, R. A. Pelkey, returned the Writ on July 17, 1871, confirming that

he had "posted notice o f attachment" on mining claims 13, 18, 19 20, and 21 in the Barrett
District, and requesting fees therefore in the amount of $6.25.
Attachments were sometimes flawed. In Boneher and Telefir vs David O'Brian et.
Stephens moved for discharge of the attachment, alleging that the sureties were not in the
territory, that the undertaking had been filed ten months prior to the issuance of the Writ, and
that the "affidavit does not pretend to show that the demand is on an express contract for the
direct payment of money.

In another case, W.R. Post vs. William Stevens (no relation),

Stephens, representing Post, had obtained an attachment. The defendant thereafter sought
release of the property, requiring Stephens, on June 10, 1872, to bring a motion to "stay the
issue o f an order for the release of any property levied upon for the plaintiff. ..the Deft not
having given a bond as required by law."*^* The just described sequences reflect modern
procedure for prejudgment attachment, including the defendant's right to preserve possession
by bond.*^^ Because of the distance in time, however, the similarity to Anglo-Saxon

’^^Note that the plaintiffs bond was for twice the amount of the claim.
1010-18.
‘^’3, 0429-30. There is no record of the result of Stephens' motion.
1^^,0 6 1 3 .

^^^ontana's statutes concerning prejudgment attachment, contained in Title 27, chapter
18 of the Montana Code Annotated, are typical. Title 27-18-101 provides: "Cases in which
property may be attached.(l) Property may be attached in: (a) An action upon a contract,
express or implied, for the direct payment of money where the contract: (i) is not secured by
any mortgage or lien upon real property; or (ii) is originally secured and such security has,
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procedures is far more striking. As mentioned above, in Anglo-Saxon possessory disputes
where title was unclear, the plaintiff had to assert good faith, as Joseph Lemoureaux, above,
did, and the defendant had to pledge security, which Stevens failed to do.
The most important Anglo-Saxon influence was also the most obvious: the jury. The
Anglo-Saxon "popular assembly, parliament, law-court, and army in one" (see footnote 4)
decided all judicial disputes. The magistrate, the shire-reeve, was more o f a sergeant-at-arms
and a master o f ceremonies than an arbiter o f the law. There were few legal questions; the
jury simply resolved the dispute. Although in the nineteenth century, the power of the jury
eroded, one searches the court files of Missoula County in vain for much legal argument. Dr.
Hall notes that in the eighteenth century, instructions to the jury were "informal and
nontechnical."*^® In Stephens day, counsel proposed jury instructions as they do today, and
sought every advantage in them.

In Cvrus McWhirk and William McWhirk vs. F L

Worden and C. P. Higgins, plaintifis alleged that the defendants were the owners of a mill on
the bank of the Missoula River (now the Clark Fork) and were in possession o f a certain ditch

without any act of the plaintiff or the person to
whom the security was given, become valueless..."
Section 205 of Chapter 18 empowers a judge to issue a prejudgment writ when: "(1)
he has received the affidavit described in 27-18-202; (2) he has approved the undertaking
required in 27-18-204; and (3) the party seeking attachment has made a prima facie showing:
(a) in the case of real property, of his right to attachment and the necessity for seizure; (b) in
the case of personal property: (i) o f his right to attachment and the necessity for seizure at a
show cause hearing before the court with at least 3 days' notice to the defendant...or (ii) of
his right to attachment and the necessity for seizure and that the delay caused by notice and
a hearing would seriously impair the remedy sought by the person seeking possession.
Evidence of such impairment must be presented in open court, and the court must set forth
with specificity the reasons why such delay would seriously impair the remedy sought by the
person seeking attachment."
*^®Hall, The Magic Mirror. 107.
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which "diverted waters from rattlesnake creek" and "allowed the said ditch to be out of
repair..so as to overflow the plaintiffs land." Any flooding o f the McWhirks* land was a
serious offense. They had surrounded their East Front Street cabin with a large vegetable and
flower garden, which was a landmark for travelers entering the Missoula Valley from the east,
and it is to their efforts that the appellation "the Garden City," to which Missoulians still cling,
can be traced."' The Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' agents placed obstructions in the
ditch, causing the overflow. Stephens, for the Plaintiffs, submitted jury instructions, in part,
as follows;
The jury are instructed that if defendants owned or used a ditch which passed
over the land of plaintiffs, he was bound to use it so as not to injure plaintiffs
lands and this irrespective of the question as to which had the older right or
title, and if through any fault or neglect of defendant in not properly managing
or keeping his ditch in repair, the water overflowed or broke through or
seeped through the banks and destroyed or damaged the land of plaintiffs or
any goods or property plaintiffs had thereon defendant would be liable for
such injury."^
In short, the plaintiffs alleged negligence. The Defendants of course submitted their own set
of proposed instructions, asking that any contributory negligence on the part o f the plaintiff
serve as a complete bar to recovery:
If the jury believe from the evidence the plaintiffs by negligence or
carelessness in any manner or to any extent contributed to the production of
the injury they will find this verdict for the defendants.*"

'"Koelbel, 33.
*"3, 0596.
*"3, 0592.
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The jury, incidentally, brought in a verdict for the defense.*^'* It is difficult to say whether or
not these instructions were, in Hall's words, informal and nontechnical, but it can be said for
a fact that they were much, much shorter than what one could expect today. In addition, no
statutory or decisional authority was submitted in support o f the proposed instructions. The
jury received a few general common law principles to guide the verdict. Judges did not
attempt to micro-manage (as they often do today.) If the jury had less than the near absolute
authority o f the ancient courts, they had more than they do today. Thus, in many of its
fundamentals, the Anglo-Saxon machinery was still alive in Stephens' Missoula.
As the Germanic tribes had no evolved civil procedure before trial, however, any
discussion of such found in Stephens' cases must be viewed apart from these older streams
o f influence. One procedural device found in abundance in Missoula County in the 1870's
was the demurrer.^^^ Defendants demurred so often that the purpose must usually have been
vexatious. Stephens demurred as often as anyone. For example, in Edward St. Germain vs.
Brunnet & Ladaux. he alleged in a brief paragraph that "the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.""^ Against a plaintiff, Neptune Lynch, who sought
to foreclose upon a chattel mortgage executed by defendants Wiles and Decker, Stephens was
a bit more prolific:
...the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

134

3, 0588.

A demurrer is a response to a complaint (or answer) which basically says: "Even if I
were to admit everything you have said, you still have not offered a legally adequate grievance
(or answer)." In a way, it says: "so what?".
0890.
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That the complaint is ambiguous uncertain and unintelligible in this
That it does not appear by the complaint whether the action is brought for the
payment of certain promissory notes therein stated above or the foreclosure
o f a certain mortgage therein stated above, or for both.^^’
Demurrers are now disfavored, even where theyare still allowed. In California, some practice
manualsadvise counsel to append a declaration to a demurrer detailing efforts to resolve the
matter informally with the opponent.
Depositions were taken in Stephens day, but not as a matter of course. They occurred
in the more protracted cases. In McWhirk vs. Worden and Higgins. Stephens noticed the
deposition o f a witness as follows;
The above named DeAs, or their attorney A.H. Mayhew will hereby take
notice that the plffs will take the deposition of A. Hilly as a witness for plffs
in the above cause on the 15 day of May 1873 at the office of Thos. M
(illegible) Justice of the Peace in the Town of Missoula at one P. M. of that
clay\
This is substantially the language used today. Records of the depositions are difficult to find.
One, in Joseph Lorraine et. al. vs George M. Windes. suggests that narrative questions"^
were more in use than one would expect today, even in deposition ("State what you know
concerning a charge against you for the sum of $126 46/100 for goods sold and delivered to
you by Plaintiffs as alleged in this complaint")."^ TWs suggests either less skill on the part

"^2, 1083.
"*3, 0572.
^^^"Narrative" questions are questions which invite a long answer. They are improper at
trial. WTiile allowÂIe in deposition, attorneys oAen prefer to avoid giving the witness a great
deal o f latitude.
1403, 1274-5.
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o f the lawyers, or that the lawyers anticipated less skillful witnesses.
While court records do not contain any documentation o f informal conferences and
efiforts at settlement, they do confirm that a great many cases were settled prior to trial. The
stipulation in Mil green vs. Doyle was typical:
...That for and in consideration of the Sum of one thousand dollars in hand
paid by the parties of the second part the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledge. The party of the first part does hereby agree to dismiss a suit
at law he did commence against the parties of the second part for the recovery
of the possession of mining claim fifty-nine (59)...*^^
Stephens, representing the plaintiff, had a stipulated dismissal entered, on condition of
payment of all costs in fifteen days, in the case of J. H. Hopkins vs. Adam Rutherford et. al."^
Always the detail man, he also remembered to enter a satisfaction of judgment in the
Lamoureaux matter after receipt of a note for $125.00."^ Admittedly, a better practice would
have been to withhold the satisfaction until the note was paid, for if the note were not in fact
paid, the case would have had to have been reopened.
The procedure in use in Missoula County shared some of the devices employed during
German pre-history. These included, principally, the reliance upon oaths and the immediate
concern with possession. Missoula County also utilized a great body of procedure which is
still in use, including, by way of overview, the entire pattern o f a court case. Still, the frontier
and modern proceedings possess attitudinal differences from one another.

In frontier

Missoula the courts aimed to get everything gathered up (for example, the subject matter) and

0156.
0212.

"^2, 1068.
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get the case resolved. In modem courts, resolution is approached with a greater hesitancy.
Legal procedure is not a subject likely to stir the passions of the populace. But
procedure is much more than a body of dry legal strictures. Through procedures one can
perceive the real workings o f the law and what it seeks to achieve. Beyond that, one can
trace the treads of continuity between historical periods, as well as the accumulated changes.
It is often forgotten that the "Bill of Rights," which Americans cherish so devotedly, and
which seems to stand for what is best about the United States, is largely a body of mandated
procedure and procedural restrictions.
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Chapter 4. The Early Practice: The Substance o f the Causes

A survey of clearly identifiable causes indicates that Stephens, in the first ten years of
his practice in Missoula County, appeared in better than five times as many commercial
(including consumer) disputes as land disputes, a statistic confirming that Missoula in its
earliest days was essentially what it remains today: a trading center for Western Montana.
Stephens' bountifiil harvest of litigation also underscores how little the changes that were
affecting the legal profession in urban areas, particularly the rise of the office lawyer, the
"counselor" to industry, touched an outpost like Missoula.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of commercial actions, there was no shortage of
mining disputes. Milgreen vs. Doyle, was typical. The plaintiff expressed a typical injury, that
he had been ejected fi'om his claim, and that the interlopers were busy extracting the gold.
The above named plaintiff complains of the above named defendants that... he
is and was the owner and was on or about the 15th day of November 1870 in
lawful undisturbed and peaceable possession under the mining laws of Barretts
[?] the following described property [lengthy description]
...That on or about 14 day o f nov 1870 defendants entered into and ousted
this plaintiff therefrom and has ever since withheld and does now withhold the
possession of the premises from this plaintiff and use the same for their own
purposes...
The land had no value beyond its treasure o f ore. As it was being looted and was becoming
valueless before the plaintiffs eyes, Stephens requested an injunction:
[if the defendants continue] to extract the gold or other minerals therefrom the

i^^Hall, 212.
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injury to this plaintiff will be irreparable and said mining claim will [illegible]
a mass of rubbish and the plaintiff will be remediless at law for all of the Said
defendants are wholly insolvent...
Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment... for the possession o f said mining ground
and for the sum of four hundred Dollars damages up to the time o f the
commencement o f this action and for the Sum of fifty Dollars per day
damages (thereafter)... and that during the pendency of this suit the defendants
their employees and agents and all persons in privity with them be enjoined
and restrained from working the said mining claim or digging or removing the
sand and ground thereof or extracting the mineral substances therefrom or in
any manner molesting or interfering with the same and that at the trial of this
cause the same be made perpetual...^'*®
An interesting aspect of this case was that it was premised upon a "miner's code."
Friedman has described these codes as "little bodies o f law, adopted as binding customs in
Western mining camps." These ad hoc law codes set up "rough but workable rules and
processes, for recording claims, for deciding whose claim was first, for settling disputes
among claimants, and for enforcing decisions o f miners' courts.

Raymond August's Ph.

D. dissertation traced the miners' codes to the Spanish Mining Code.

While no

incontrovertible evidence of adoption exists, August persuasively contended that Mexican and
Chilean miners poured into the California fields before news of the strike arrived in the United
States. These hispanic miners brought the law that they knew with them. Arriving Americans
found the law entirely serviceable. From California, the miners' codes moved eastward.

‘"‘^2, 025-7, 22-3 (pages out o f sequence in the transcript). Modem practitioners would
readily recognize the elements o f injunctive relief, specifically that "irreparable damage"
would ensue if the injunction is not granted, and that a judgment for money would be
inadequate (here, because of the defendant's insolvency).
^‘‘^Friedman, 319.
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following the strikes/'*^ The codes became a sort of particularized common law for mining
camps all over the Western United States, including M o n t a n a . I n 1860, the Colorado
territorial legislature had expressly ratified the decisions of these courts (although it seems
they should have withstood attack in any event, as they were really awards of binding
arbitration.)^'*®
In another case premised upon miners’ law, Stephens represented A. W. Demers in
his suit against Eudjor Jencotte, Henry Romaine, and George Ferault. Demers alleged that
he had a one-fourth interest as a tenant in common with the defendants in certain mining
properties "in San Louis nnning districts all within Missoula County Montana Territory under
the mining laws thereof; and for a property in the "Eurtache (?) mining district Missoula
County Montana Territory under the mining laws thereof"*^® Although the details are
significantly different, the thrust of Demers' Complaint is similar to Doyle's: he had been
expelled from his claim (here by co-owners), and the wrongdoers were urgently removing
everything o f value (the gold) from the claim. Stephens wrote:
That on the 13th day of April aforesaid (1876) the said plaintiff came into and

^'’’Raymond S. August, Law in the American West: A History of its Origins and its
Dissemination. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Idaho, 1987.
*'‘*Malone, Reeder, and Lang, 79; Dan Cushman, Montana^the Gold Frontier. (Great
Falls: Stay Away, Joe Publishers, 1973), 68.
Similarly, the laws o f the Barrett District were at least indirectly enforceable as
evidences of commercial practices.
"The Mining Laws of the Barrett District Cedar Creek" were recorded in Missoula
County on April 1, 1870(1,1226-1232).

***^Tenancy in Common is a type o f joint ownership in which each owner holds an
undivided interest in property.
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upon the said mining claims for the purpose of representing and working his
interest thereon with said defendants. That said defendants would not
recognize his title to the interest in the claims...but denied his title and
forcibly prevented him from working thereon...That said defendants would
give plaintiff no account of the gold extracted.
The complaint also alleged that once the claims were exhausted the defendants proposed to
go to the Black Hills where they would be beyond the reach o f the Montana court. Thus, the
situation required an immediate remedy. In addition to damages, Stephens asked for the
appointment of a receiver to protect the plaintiffs interest.^®^ Accordingly, on May 4, 1876,
in chambers. Judge Knowles appointed Hank Nightengale, of Nine Mile Creek, receiver "to
take charge of and control the plaintiffs interest in the mining claims in plaintiffs complaint."
Knowles ordered Nightengale to "faithfully perform and discharge the duties o f such trust"
and to post bond/^^
The issuance of an injunction (as in Milgreen) and the appointment o f a receiver
served much the same purpose—to stop the defendants from getting possession of the
plaintiffs gold. The injunction in Milgreen halted mining. The receivership in Demers
permitted mining to continue, but the preserved the plaintiffs alleged share. In Milgreen,
where outsiders had expelled the plaintiff, injunction was the better remedy. Milgreen wanted
mining stopped altogether until he was restored to possession. In Demers, however, the
defendants had a right to be there and to mine the claim, because they were co-owners. They

1846-51.
1827, 1850-52. A "receiver" is a person appointed by the court to take possession
of and preserve property or funds o f another, pending the outcome of litigation.
i»4. 1829-1830.
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had no right, however, to expropriate the Demers' share. Hence a receivership, pursuant to
which a receiver would take possession of, sequester, and preserve Demers' share, provided
the appropriate remedy. The Demers defendants could work the claim twenty-four hours a
day; and under the aegis of the receiver, Demers' could get his share without getting his hands
dirty.
In Hopkins v. Rutherford, an action for Breach o f Contract, the plaintiff alleged an
agreement under which Rutherford would work Hopkin s claim, and pay him one third of the
take. Apparently, even in the rough and tumble mining districts, labor and capital inexorably
found their places.
Promissory notes occupied the courts far more often than actions arising from
disputed mining claims. The prevalence o f notes is explained by the fact that a promissory
note was often the only document produced to provide evidence of a credit transaction.
Lawsuits against delinquent commercial customers and consumers often stated simply that
a note had been made by the defendant and had become past due under its terms. A simple
note, then, served where today a more elaborate contract might be expected. This is easy to
understand. The language of a promissory note was short, handy, self-explanatory, and
sufficient to document the existence o f the debt. For example,

Thomas Foley sued John

Hennessey upon a note in writing which said;
I the undersigned promise to pay the bearer Thomas Foley or order the sum
o f the sum o f Ten [?] dollars on the 20th day of October 1871 which I the
undersigned John Hennessey promise to pay for value received from [?] Foley
which are the improvements on the Sullivan and Shea Ranch so called with
one breaking plough giving my hand and name John Hennessey.,..^*'*

154

2, 2196.
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Thus Hennessey was a contractor, engaged to improve agricultural real estate.

The

agreement was memorialized as a note, instead of, as we would now expect, a contract.
Likewise, merchants often extended credit while requiring the customer to execute
a note which recited only "for value received." At the same time, the same customer's ledger
might identify a portion o f the balance not otherwise documented, requiring the plaintiff to
separate his account into two separate causes o f action; that is, to sue on one delinquent
balance on one theory (default upon the note) and another upon a different theory (for the
value of the goods). In the first, the evidence would be the note, in the second, the value of
the goods. The distinction may seem elusive to lay readers, but it determined the evidence
the attorney had to adduce. If the distinction was lost on the lawyer, he might lose the case.
For example, when Stephens represented R. D. Leggett in a suit against John C. McIntosh,
he alleged:
That on the 1st day o f June 1869 the said Defendant at the County o f Deer
Lodge made executed and delivered to this plaintiff his certain promissory
Note in writing by which said Defendant promised to pay this plff for value
received the Sum of $68 40/100 dollars with interest thereon at the rate of 5
per cent per month fi'om date until paid...[the note is then replicated in full]
Plaintiff further alleges as a further and Separate Cause of Action that the said
defendant in the year 1870 became indebted to him in the Sum of $58.00 for
goods wares and merchandize sold and delivered to the said Defendant by the
said plaintiff at the County o f Deer Lodge MT. at his the said defendant's
special instance and request...^®*
The first cause o f action was on the note. For the second, Stephens was forced to plead a

‘” 3, 0494-6.
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common count for goods sold and delivered

As to the second count, the plaintiff was

probably chagrined that he had to forego interest accruing at five per cent per month, and
instead settle for the legal rate of ten per cent per year. Perhaps, as a good lawyer, Stephens
utilized the opportunity to give his client a brief lecture on the wisdom of written instruments.

T. J. Demers neglected to specify an interest rate on a thirty day note made by
Clement Lamoureaux in the face amount of $ 139.24. Stephens could therefore ask only for
legal interest in the suit.^*^ As to this omission, any admonitions Stephens proffered should
have been given lightly. He himself could ask only for the legal rate when he pursued D. K.
Butler, after Butler defaulted upon a one hundred dollar note in Stephens' favor.**®
If creditors were cryptic about the details o f the consideration for the debt, they were
particular about the details o f repayment. Notes unfailingly established the due date and,
usually, the interest rates with precision. Further, they particularized the kind and quality of
money to be received in payment. The note upon which James Manning sued D. K Butler,
Ben [?] Kennedy, E. D Barron, Nicholas Barron and James Hayes, in the face amount of
$2,000.00, specified that payment was to be remitted in "clean Bankable gold dust or coin."**®
Stephens represented Daniel. J Welch against Henry Dunkhem in a suit upon a note "payable

**®The "common counts" are actions alleging that some value or benefit was conferred by
the plaintiff to the defendant and that remuneration (being the reasonable value of the goods
or services conferred) is due.
**’2, 0979-81.
***4, 2423.
*^®2, 1028-30.
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only in Gold coin o f the United States o f America.
Stephens always carefully computed the interest so that the terms of the note clearly
supported the amounts claimed in the prayer. He represented Hugh Byron against David
Cetchan and John M. Barron in an action to collect upon a note in the face amount of
$500.00. Although the note was past due, the defendants had made a thirteen dollar eightyfive cent payment. Stephens dutifully asked for interest (two per cent per month) on the sum
o f $500.00 until March 15, 1872—the date of the payment—and thereafter for interest on
$486.15 only.
Secured notes were common as well. Neptune Lynch complained when F. B Decker
and David Pattee‘® defaulted upon a series of promissory notes, all executed on August 7,
1872 for a cumulative sum of $2,547.97. After setting forth the notes, Stephens, representing
the plaintiff, alleged that the defendants, concurrently with the making o f the notes, had
delivered a certain Indenture of Mortgage, encumbering "One Steam Saw Mill with steam
engine, hooks...(?), files, and tools o f every description belonging, or in anyway appertaining
to the Said Saw Mill." The Indenture, in turn, had been "duly recorded as a mortgage in the
office o f the clerk o f the County o f Missoula on the 7th day of Aug 1870 in Book A of
Mortgages at page 216."^^^ Untroubled by the potential conflict of interest, Stephens

^^"3, 1366.
^"3, 0478-81.
^^^Pattee was one of the founders of Missoula and was involved in numerous business
ventures during the 1870's. Koelbel, Missoula the Way it Was. 31.
1633^ 1297-1300. The case was settled and dismissed (3, 1250).
M ost states have since adopted the provisions o f the Uniform Commercial Code

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

represented Daniel J. Welch when he foreclosed upon a chattel mortgage given by the same
Neptune Lynch, this securing a $500.00 note (bearing interest at 4% per month) with
Fifty-four head of stock that is to say, fourteen (14) head o f [?] Cows branded
with a figure two (2) on the left Hip; also: Six two year old Cows without
[?)] also, fourteen (14) head of two year old steers and heifers all branded
with a circled 2 thus. ..on the left side; also nine (9) calves belonging to the
fourteen (14) head o f aged cows; also, four (4) cows with three (3)
calves...also two (2) yoke of work oxen...Which mortgage was duly
acknowledged...and...afterwards duly recorded on the 9th day o f November
1872 in Book A of Mortgages Page 231. ..^^
If anything, modem chattel mortgages are less specific.
Since actions that one would expect to be plead in contract were so often transposed
into notes, actions for breach were rare. They usually arose when a disappointed party to a
vague agreement managed to find a lawyer to champion his cause. When Nathaniel Layne
and John Crutchfield felt aggrieved by L M Lafontaine and Louis Celaimant, the firm of
Mayhew & McMurtry filed the complaint on their behalf. The lawyers began tentatively
enough, claiming: "[t]hat heretofore to wit on the 15th day of February 1871 said defendants
made and entered into a contract with plaintiffs which said contract was in substance as
follows."

From there the lawyers unfolded a tale which required determination to

comprehend. The defendants agreed that if the plaintiffs would construct a sawmill and have
it ready for machinery to be installed by June 1, 1871, they, the defendants, "would purchase
and furnish a saw...and all other necessary machinery to complete the said mill for cutting
lumber." Additionally, defendants agreed to provide clothing and provisions for the plaintiffs

("UCC"). Under the UCC, Security interests in personal property are perfected on a form
UCC-1, and registered with the Secretary of State.
^«^3, 1284-5.
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wMle they were constructing the mill. For their part, the plaintiffs were to pay for part of the
machinery and support by supplying defendants with four hundred dollars worth o f lumber.
"The balance," not specified as to amount or otherwise defined at all, "plaintiffs were to pay
when they could." The plaintiffs spent all of their money erecting the mill "and also became
involved in debts contracted for the same purpose." Beyond this, they said only that they had
"suffered great damage" and prayed judgment in the amount o f fifteen hundred dollars and
costs. Stephens appeared for the defense. The court file gives no hint of the result, but that
fact suggests that the plaintiffs' troubles did not end when they had finally finished the
complaint, as questionable causes often die on the vine.*^®
In another matter, Michael Martin and William Stevens each maintained accounts for
moneys owing by one to the other. The arrangement survived for three years, but on May
7, 1872 they held a meeting to net the offsets and settle any remaining balance. Martin
alleged that although it had been determined that Stevens owed him $660.50, Stevens had
failed to pay. William J. Stephens represented the plaintiff, claiming that the settlement
agreement had been breached, and won a judgment for $682.48, inclusive of costs.
When there was no written contract, lawyers then did what they do now; plead the
common count. Stephens represented Hugh McMahon against Larry Keatory [?]. In the
complaint, Stephens alleged that McMahon had worked four months and twenty-two days
at the defendant's farm in the Bitter Root valley and that $218.66 was due and owing from
the defendant for "work done and performed for the said defendant at his the said defendant's

i^^2, 1452-4.
0455-6.
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special instance and request.
Stephens represented E.J. Bonner and R. A. Eddy "comprising the firm o f R. A &
Co." against Moses Reeves, Louis Brown, and Louis Beaufire (?), alleging that the defendant.
Reeves, had become indebted in the sum of "fourteen hundred sixty nine dollars and thirty six
cents for goods wares and merchandise sold and delivered." From there, Stephens skillfully
sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate from Reeves to the other
defendants:
Plaintiff further alleges that in the year 1871 he the said defendant Reeves was
the owner of property in the County of Missoula Montana of about the value
o f $10,000 dollars. That the said property would have been more than
sufficient to pay all his debts including plaintiffs demand. That on or about
the 16th day o f May 1871 the said defendant Reeves disposed of all the said
property to one Louis Brown and Louis Beaufire (?) and others to whom he
was not indebted more than three or four hundred dollars and from whom he
received no consideration other that the said amount...
That the said Brown and Beaufire (?) conspired with the said defendant
Reeves in order to aid the said Reeves to cheat his creditors and particularly
this plaintiff...
Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment against the said defendant Reeves for the
said sum...and that the sale made to the said Brown and Beaufire (?) be set
aside as fraudulent...
The case was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.
Torts to the person were rare in Missoula County. James W. Ely Jr.'s study of
Andrew Jackson's legal career found a paucity of torts on the North Carolina and Tennessee

^^’3, 0511-3. Stephens obtained a default judgment. A modern lawyer would have plead
a verbal contract and an "implied in fact" contract in addition to the common count.
0598-60.
0639
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frontiers as well, although defamation was a frequent source o f litigation in a region where
reputation was treasured/’®Missoula County residents did not trouble their attorneys about
affronts to their honor, but trespasses to land were another matter.

For example, as

mentioned earlier, Cyrus and William McWhirk sued Worden and Higgins for allegedly
flooding their land.
W ater rights, always a passionate issue in the American West, were aggressively
litigated in Missoula County. C C O'Keefe complained against John Roland that the latter
had "wrongfully and unlawfully diverted and took and carried away the waters of the said
stream by means of artificial canals and ditches."” ^ Stephens brought suit on behalf of
Michael Gannon against Thomas Foley. Stephens alleged that Foley had "wantonly, wilfiilly
and maliciously...destroyed a No. 8 Sewing Machine o f Wheeler and Wilson manufacture"
and other personal property belonging to Gannon. As a result, Gannon lost his ability to
support his family, "giving him great distress and anxiety of mind rendering his life
burdensome... all of which distressed (the plaintiffs) mind to an extreme degree." The prayer
asked for the value o f the destroyed property ($245.00), plus $500.00 for the "distress,
discouragement, anxiety and general unhappiness."*” The Court instructed the jury that it
m i^ t award damages for the value of the destroyed property, for loss of use thereof, and for
"punitive" damages if it, the jury, determined that the defendant acted "wilfully or
maliciously." The Court issued no instructions as to any general (non-economic) damages

*’®Ely, "The Legal Practice o f Andrew Jackson," 428.
*’*2, 0931,2.
*” 5, 1928-30.
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for emotional distress, effectively denying the claim as a matter of law. Emotional injuries,
therefore, were still considered too ethereal in frontier Missoula. The jury brought in a
verdict for $93.00.*’^ In general, the tort revolution was the better part o f a century away.*’“
Stephens participated in other cases which required a surprising level of sophistication.
In 1874, voters repudiated a school tax. The frustrated school board hastily had held another
election upon doubtful authority. The tax passed at the subsequent election. The Board's
action outraged a number of influential citizens. Stephens and W. C. McCormick represented
F. L. Worden, John Higgins, D. J.l Simmons, H McFarland and E. Rende "on their own
behaH^ and on behalf of aU other taxable inhabitants of School District No. 3" against W. G
Edwards, the County Treasurer and tax collector. The "homespun" quality of some of the
other pleadings quoted herein is utterly absent in the seven page complaint Stephens and
McCormick crafted. A part-time lawyer, McCormick devoted most of his attention to real
estate, the town newspaper (The Missoula Pioneer, which he had owned for a while), and his
mill at Fort Owen, which he had bought at the end of 1872. Stephens, on the other hand, was
the most active lawyer in the community.

Unlike many o f his adversaries, including

McCormick, he never blurted his facts when drafting a pleading; his counts, even when

^^^5, 1955-7. Most tort damages seek to compensate the victim for the harm suffered, as,
for example, Gannon was to be compensated for the value o f his property which had been
wrongfully destroyed, and for the money he would have made but for its destruction.
"Punitive" or "exemplary" damages, however, are awarded to punish the wrongdoer, not to
compensate the victim. Punitive damages are only awarded where the jury is satisfied that
the wrongdoer's behavior was intentional, and not merely careless.
^’^'The Missoula firm of Garlington, Lohn, and Robinson claims to be a successor to the
practice W. J. Stephens began in Missoula. It is now the largest and perhaps the most
prestigious in Western Montana. Most o f their business is insurance defense.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
propounding the most pedestrian grievance, were always well crafted. While it is not clear
that Stephens could claim credit for the quality of the pleading, he probably deserved it. He
was certainly much the superior lawyer.

All of that aside, the school tax case was probably

Missoula County's first class action lawsuit.^’®The Court set a hearing on the requested
injunction on December 8, 1874. That is the last entry in the file.^^’
Stephens also handled an occasional divorce. Cecile Stone v. William Stone, as with
most divorces in Missoula County, alleged desertion.^’* While there was no "no fault" divorce
in Missoula County, policy considerations, that is, the focus of the court's concern, did not
differ from what one would expect today.*’® Sophia Sparanburg vs. George William

*’®Stephens and McCormick were often adversaries. In Thos. M Pomerov vs. John
Brown. J. A. Nicholsand W. J. McCormick. McCormick, represented all defendants (that is,
including himself.) Stephens represented the plaintiff. McCormick filed a demurrer, but
neglected to serve Stephens. Stephens promptly obtained the defendants' default, as no
responsive pleading and been duly filed and served. Seeking to set aside the default,
McCormick filed an aflSdavit insisting that he and Stephens had adopted a "rule" o f "accepting
service and waiving copies," which meant that a party would simply review a pleading,
motion, or response for content and waive receipt of a written out copy. The very next day,
June 14, 1871, Stephens filed a counter-affidavit denying that there had been any such "rule,"
and explaining to the court that a custom existed amongst County lawyers where, upon
request, copies were waived, and there had in this instance been no such request. Stephens
style, then, was rigorous, even punctilious, especially when compared with McCormick, who
used words like "rule" with a sloppiness unbefitting a lawyer.
*’®4, 1698-1705.
*” 4, 1107.
*’*1,414-5.
*’®Many modem jurisdictions have sought to make divorces easier to obtain and less
acrimonious by the adoption of so-called "no fault" statutes. Before no fault, a party sued for
divorce, alleging some reprehensible conduct on the part of the other spouse, such as
desertion, adultery, etc. In a no fault jurisdiction, the petitioner usually alleges only that
"irreconcilable differences" have arisen which are "irremediable." There is no blame. The
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SpM^byrg, while outside the time parameters o f the chapter, illustrated much about divorce
in nineteenth century Missoula, because it was seriously contested, because it contained
allegations and cross-allegations which ring familiar to the modem reader, because there was
a dispute as to custody of the three children, and because it went to trial. Sophia Sparanburg,
through her attorneys Stephens and Bickford, alleged that
that the defendant has treated her in a cruel and inhuman manner.. that on the
23 rd day of December 1879, the defendant...by threats of violence drove the
plaintiff from the shelter o f her house and would not for a number o f hours
allow her to return, she was exposed to cold and inclement weather...
That upon divers occasions, and so frequently as to render the life of plaintiff
unendurable and miserable...the defendant used violent, abusive, and
scandalous language and accused the plaintiff of conjugal infidelity and
adultery without any cause therefore...
...the plaintiff was in fear of great bodily harm and did at divers times
sustain...bodily injury being struck and beaten by defendant...
That in the month of February 1884. .. the defendant came to his house in an
intoxicated and drunken condition, and by using violent and abusive language
kept the plaintiff awake all night...the plaintiffs life was, and has been
rendered miserable by the conduct of the defendant...and this plaintiff is
informed and believes,"" [that the defendant] committed adultery with lude
[sic] women in the town of Missoula.
Apparently, the very last straw for Mrs. Sparanburg was when her husband placed a
legal notice in the "Weekly Mlssoulian" disclaiming any responsibility "for any bills contracted
by Mrs. Sophia Sparanburg." Defendant George William Sparanburg filed his answer,
specifically denying all of the misconduct his wife had alleged, except for the legal notice.

petitioner is saying little more than "I do not want to be married anymore."
**"The use of the phrase "informed and believes" means that the belief is based on hearsay,
not personal knowledge. The phrase is frequently used in modem pleadings.
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This notice, he said, occurred because
defendant was mining and operating a mill (in Lolo). ..(and) he leased said mill
to other parties and made his arrangements to move his family to Missoula
when the plaintiflFdeclined to come and told this defendant that she would not
live in town and that she would not live with him any more and that she was
going to put this defendant in debt and break him...
Further, defendant said that he, not she, was the abused party, and that he, not she, was the
suitable custodian for the children: "that the said plaintiff is a women o f violent passion and
has...abused this defendant...that (defendant) is able to maintain educate and care for said
children and...said plaintiff would not and could not." On November 17, 1885, after trial and
deliberations, jury foreman Richard Beche presented the Court with a note disclosing the
verdict:
We the Juiy find for the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is the proper person to
have the custody of the children. We also specifically find that defendant is
an able bodied man and can earn three dollars per day.
Accordingly, Judge Gallraill dissolved the bonds o f matrimony, awarded custody of the
children to Mrs. Sparanburg, and ordered "said plaintiff have and recover of defendant for her
support and the support o f said children, from and after this date the sum of one dollar per
day, for during and until said children arrived at and become o f the age of sixteen years."
The parallels with modem family law proceedings are striking, particularly the primacy
of the concern for the best interests of the children, the establishment of a support schedule
based on both the earnings and the earning ability of the payor spouse, and the setting of the
support level at, roughly, half the payor spouse's "spendable income," (a modem, somewhat
fluid term meaning income remaining after due allowance for base living expenses, business
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costs, and so forth).*”
Stephens handled various other matters, and, of course, he had his own accounts to
look after. On November 24, 1874, Stephens wrote the following note:
Marchisault
Dear Sir
Maisset [?] informed me you had funds to pay expenses of suit. My fee for
services in the Dist. Court is $50.00.
I already informed Maisset o f this when here.
Yours Truly,
W. J. Stephens
At the bottom o f the page one finds the notation: "Received payment Nov. 25, 1874 WJ
Stephens by Marion."*” Stephens was not a man to be put off. When Albert Adkins, Levi
Adkins and J. L. Mellgreen sought to avoid his fee, Stephens sued. In a complaint filed July
18, 1871, Stephens alleged that he and the Adkins had
entered into a verbal contract by which ...plaintiff was to perform legal
services ...in the action o f J. L. Mellgreen vs. Thos. Doyle et al... and the said
defendants agreed to pay this plaintiff the Sum of $125.00 as an absolute fee
therein and in the event of this plaintiff gaining the Suit (?) then to pay him the
further Sum o f $375.00.
The defendants, Stephens went on, settled the case outside of his knowledge. Acknowledging
the receipt o f $50.00, Stephens demanded the rest—that is, what would have been due had he
tried and won the case: another $450.00. The same day, July 18, 1871, he filed an affidavit
stating that the defendants had sold their entire mining interest in Cedar Creek and "are now
on their way to the Atlantic states" and thereby obtained the issuance of an arrest warrant.

*«*10, 560-611.
*«M, 556. "Maisset" presumably was an assistant to Stephens.
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On July 19, Sheriff Pelkey returned the warrant stating: "I certify that I have served the within
writ [?] arresting the within named defendants at Flint Creek in Deer Lodge Co." Pelkey
itemized his costs, including $25 for "bringing prisoners." The next entry in the file, October
18, 1871, is to the point: "Cause settled and clerk will please make that entry (signed) WJ
Stephens.""^ Stephens was the sort o f man who took his obligations seriously; and he
expected the same. He was wise to collect his accounts aggressively, for Missoula was soon
to encounter hard times.
The Civil Register for the period of 1870-1880 is surprisingly weighted toward the
early years. That is, while the population continued to grow throughout the seventies, the
litigation decreased. During the period commencing January 1, 1870 and ending December
31, 1873, an average of 46.5 actions were filed per year in Missoula County. During the
period commencing January 1, 1874 and ending December 31, 1879, an average o f only 36.33
actions were commenced per year (a drop off of about twenty-two per cent). For an
explanation one must look beyond the Missoula Valley to the island o f Manhattan, where Jay
Cooke's bankruptcy had precipitated a national panic. Cooke’s casualties included the
bankruptcy of the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1873, which dealt a crushing blow to
Montana. Cooke's downfall also cost the Missoula National Bank, only thirty-five days old
when the disaster occurred, over $8,000.00. It could have been worse. Only the urgent
telegrams o f cashier Ferdinand Kennett halted another three purses o f gold enroute to New

183

1, 1049-1068.
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Y ork for deposit with Jay Cooke and Company.^*^ Missoula did survive the seventies,
however, and by the 1880s, had begun to boom again.

^®'‘John H. Toole, Red Ribbons. A Story of Missoula and its Newspaper (Davenport, Iowa;
Lee Enterprises, Incorporated, 1989), 6. Koelbel, 41.
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Chapter 5. The Eighties

In the eighties, Stephens' practice grew along with the town of Missoula. By 1880,
Missoula had about 450 residents, a fifty per cent increase in ten years. The town became
more commercial, and Stephens' practice involved bigger accounts that involved more money.
Stephens was elected County Clerk in 1884, and took on a younger partner to assist him with
the growing practice. Over the course of the decade, the litigation in which Stephens was
involved became more complex, more protracted, and the industrial world intruded in the
form o f typewritten pleadings.
The text o f his advertisements suggested the changes that Stephens' practice
underwent. When he began practice in Missoula, he used the same advertising text he had
used in Deer Lodge, with modifications.
W. J. STEPHENS
Attorney and Counselor at Law
MISSOULA, M.T.
Will practice in all the Courts o f the Territory and give
his undivided attention to collections.^*^
The only addition to the Deer Lodge advertisement was the inclusion of a specific reference
to collection work. In Deer Lodge, his copy asserted only his willingness to present and
defend claims in court. In Missoula, he thought to add a particular willingness to pursue
debts, reflecting, no doubt, that he had relocated from a mining town to a trading center. In
the late 1870's, he again changed his advertising copy, this time more drastically. Thereafter,

^*^The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer. January 5, 1871, p. 1.
82
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the advertisement read:
W. J. STEPHENS
Attorney and Counselor at Law
Missoula City, Montana
Will give special attention to drawing papers for securing land claims,
and entering lands under the Homestead, Preemption, desert land and other
U. S. laws relating to lands.
Will secure patents for mineral lands and negotiate sales o f mines; will
also collect original and arrears o f pensions under the old or recent acts of
Congress. Conveyances and contracts carefully drawn, in addition to general
law practice.^**
At first glance, the text, especially the first full paragraph, seemed to resurrect the
mining town practice in Deer Lodge, But a closer analysis suggests a different interpretation.
Established lawyers did not advertise for elite clients. Local, well-to-do clients knew the local
lawyers and their reputations, while substantial clients from outside the area obtained
referrals from fellow patricians within the area. "Important" clients (or "big-ticket" clients in
modern lawyer's slang), in short, did not find their attorneys in newspaper ads.
The change occurred because, by then, Stephens possessed a larger, more established
practice. An established lawyer either ceased print advertising, or, as with Stephens, uses it
in a more sophisticated, targeted, manner. Stephens, by the late 1870's, had an active
clientele. Further, those Missoulians active in commerce knew where to find him. The
advertisements were addressed to the mass-market legal consumer whose need for legal
services was occasional, or once, and who might have to search the newspaper to find an
attorney.

186

These clients might need help perfecting their homesteads, or gaining their

e.g. The Weeklv Missoulian. June 11, 1880, p. 1.
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pensions. Such a person did not interact with those for whom the courts are an aspect of
doing business. Even the most successful lawyer sought this type o f client; after all, they
"paid the light bills."
Andrew B. Hammond emerged as the main engine propelling Missoula's growth. As
a young man he went to work for E. L. Bonner in the Missoula's Bonner & Welch General
Store. Hammond ran the store aggressively. In 1876, he was made a partner, and the firm
was styled "Eddy, Hammond & Co."'^*’ Their business soon outstripped that of Higgins and
Worden, who had founded the settlement.
The Northern Pacific Railroad entered Montana in 1881. Naturally, the town’s
merchants eagerly sought to bring it through Missoula. Higgins and Worden donated land
for a depot and railroad yard. They were therefore much chagrined to learn that the Northern
Pacific had awarded a lucrative contract for railroad ties to Eddy, Hammond & Co. The
actual arrival of the railroad affected all Missoulians and provoked much controversy.*®* For
Stephens, however, the advent of Eddy, Hammond & Co., and the arrival of the railroad had
identical significances. Both meant new, deep-pocket defendants.
Stephens represented James Marsh in a suit against Edward Bonner, Richard A. Eddy,
and Andrew B. Hammond, "doing business...under the firm name and style of Eddy
Hammond & Co." on August 2 1882. Marsh, a subcontractor engaged to cut ties for the
railroad, alleged that he had not been fully paid.**^ Along with Walter Bickford, Stephens

*®’Richard A. Eddy was another partner.
**®Koelbel, 57-59.
**®8, 1160-1163.
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took the Northern Pacific Railroad to the Justice Court of Hellgate Township, on April 29,
1885, when James Miller complained that the Railroad refused to pay on assigned claims.
Apparently, Miller operated a kind of frontier check cashing service, purchasing the claims
of railroad workers and then claiming their compensation. Stephens and Bickford recovered
$65 for their client/” The trial record specified that Stephens and Bickford appeared for the
plaintiff. However, if the partnership followed the expected pattern, Bickford probably
handled the case himself.
Walter Mansur Bickford came to Montana in 1884 after having been educated at
Maine Central Institute at Pittsfield and admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1878. In the
latter part of his career he would become an "office lawyer." As a "corporation lawyer," he
served as vice-president of the Missoula Light and Water Company, the Missoula Street
Railway Company, and the Western Lumber Company. He was eighteen years younger than
Stephens, and, presumably, when he arrived in Missoula he sought work in the office of an
older, established attorney. Coincidentally, Stephens, who had just been elected Court Clerk
and ex-offico probate judge, needed the help o f a young lawyer to keep the practice going.
This type o f partnership was a paradigm for many law partnerships, then and now.
The older, established lawyer had the connections in the community, and his time was more
profitably spent developing and maintaining those connections, and personally serving the
larger clients. Rather than turn away the lesser cases, he found a younger lawyer, one eager
for any type of business, and hired him.

i” l l , 158-167.
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Stephens and Bickford represented James McElroy upon an account s t a t e d . T h e
complaint was filed August 23, 1884, signed "W.J. Stephens W.M. Bickford Attys for
Plaintiff.”*®^ While Stephens name appeared, his flowing handwriting did not. The manner
of appearance might have suggested some ambivalence about the partnership; McElroy was
represented by two attorneys, rather than a partnership. However, in the nineteenth century,
law partnerships were easily formed and ended. Writing o f Lincoln's numerous partnership
arrangements, John P. Frank contended:
The whole partnership relation was more casual than can be readily
understood in the twentieth century. The amount o f property jointly owned
was trifling and there were none o f the complications of accounting required
by modem taxes and business methods. Lincoln had perhaps some seventyfive o f these special partnership arrangements.
However startling the idea of seventy-five partnerships, Frank insisted that these were
bonafide partnerships, not ad hoc co-counsel arrangements.*®'* C. Robert Haywood described
Dodge City’s raucous bar as a "close-knit fraternity" in which "individuals opposed each other

*®*An "account stated" is one of the common counts. Briefly, it alleges that a business
account exists and is unpaid.
*®^10, 956-958.
*®^Frank, Lincoln as Lawyer. 16.
*®‘*Frank describes them as "standing arrangements o f some duration" (16). This would
serve as rather a loose definition of a partnership. Lawyers frequently have standing
relationships with other firms and attorneys. To be sufficiently matured so as to be called
"partnerships", then or now, they would have to so firmed up that had Lincoln elected to
handle a case within the purview of the arrangement by himself, the other "partner" could sue
and obtain the portion o f the profit called for in the "arrangement."
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literally dozens of times and were partners about as often.
Stephens had appeared with numerous other Missoula County lawyers, including
Robinson and W J. McCormick. The arrangement with Bickford, however, was the first real
partnership he was involved in after he moved to Missoula. A degree of hesitancy at the
outset was to be expected. Later, in 1896, when their partnership was the subject of bitter
litigation, Stephens would testify that it was commenced June 24, 1884,^^^ That date would
have been just seven days after he proffered a demurrer on behalf of the Belknap Town and
Improvement Company et. al. adv. Simon Marks, probably a lucrative case which he did not
share with Bickford.*’’ In any event, shortly thereafter Stephens and Bickford appeared as
"Stephens and Bickford," advertised as such, set up a concurrent real estate partnership, and
eventually brought in another young lawyer on the make, Frank Higgins.
The defendants in the Belknap case were a type of party not seen in Missoula's earlier
days—corporations. Kermit Hall has called the corporation "the form o f business that carried

*’^C. Robert Haywood, Cowtown Lawyers: Dodge City and its Attorneys. 1876-1886
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 62. This is certainly more casual use of the
term than that employed by Frank (footnote 194, above.)
'’^Missoula County Case No. 1291, testimony before D. H. Ross, Esq, Referee. The firm
of Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, which claims to be a successor (several times removed)
of Stephens practice, reports in its firm history that the partnership began in 1883, which, as
above, would have preceded Bickford's arrival in Missoula. The confusion is generated by
the fact that the Register o f Actions and Fee Book, District Court, Volume 2, page 139,
reports that in the case o f John Miller v. Joel Catching. Case No. 588, the defendant was
represented by "W. J. Stephens & W. M. Bickford," and that the case commenced September
25, 1883. Actually, Stephens undertook Catching's representation by himself on October 17,
1883. Bickford appeared at trial on October 17, 1885.
197

9, 1343 et, seq.
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the nation into the new economic age."*®* Friedman has pointed out that the corporation met
the "overriding need ...for an efficient, trouble-free device, to aggregate capital and manage
it in business, with limited liability and transferable shares."*®® Whether or not "trouble-free",
or even "efficient," the corporate form proved to be a dynamo when performing the task of
aggregating capital.
The Belknap case is also noteworthy in that it involved a suit upon a written contract,
having a copy affixed to and made part o f the complaint. Thus it had the appearance of a
modem contract suit. Simon Marks sued the Belknap Town and Improvement Company and
the Belknap Forwarding Company (a consortium o f corporations), alleging that the
defendants had breached an agreement under which Marks was to provide pack horses and
mules on a per diem basis for the purpose o f transporting freight and passengers. Despite
Stephens efforts, on November 18, 1884, Marks recovered $1,240.00 and costs after a court
tria l.^
Litigation of the 1880s demonstrates that the stakes were getting higher, reflecting the
increased prosperity after the arrival o f the Northern Pacific.

Only after 1883, when

Missoula's prosperity had been fully restored, would one find an action such as William Wood
vs. Charles W. Berrv Sheriff of the County of Missoula M l . in which Stephens and Bickford,
together with Smith and Abbot, complained that $10,000.00 worth of goods had been seized
under color of law. The Wood case revealed much about changing legal practice; the file

*®*Hall, 109.
*®®Friedman, 178.
1382.
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itself, as well as the particulars of action, had the aura of modernity. The file contained a Bill
of Exceptions prepared by the Court, in the person of the Hon. W. J. Galbraith. Moreover,
the Bill was typewritten. To frame the exceptions properly, the Bill provided a summary
record of the trial. Wood testified at the trial on June 16, 1886, describing himself as an
"expert accountant," having followed that career for "about twenty years as a specialty" in
Portland, Oregon. Apparently, through his routine business dealings in Portland, he became
aware of a firm styled Savage & Reed, which owned general stores in the towns of Belknap
and Heron, Montana. Savage & Reed owed a lot of money to Portland merchants, witnessed
by past due notes. Although the notes aggregated to nine thousand dollars, and although
some of them had face amounts ranging from $235.19 to $1,493.58, Wood purchased these
notes for the proverbial song.
At trial Wood testified: "I bought them on June 4, 1884, in Portland, Oregon I paid
one dollar for each claim...There was no understanding that I should pay anyone any part of
what I collected; they were placed in my hands without reserve.

Wood denied any

knowledge concerning the soundness of the notes. Still, he met Reed in Portland the day he
made the purchase, and took a train the next day, with Reed, for Heron, Montana. There, he
used the notes to purchase the stores, getting nearly the face value of the notes in the
exchange. For a few dollars. Wood was the proprietor of two stores and thousands of dollars
worth o f inventory. When the Sheriff sought to execute on behalf of other creditors of

^^The notes Wood listed unintentionally observe the presence Jewish entrepreneurship in
the old northwest. Those identified are: Wasserman & Co. (no relation to this writer);
Fleischner, Mayer & Co.; Boatman & Co.; Tanhauser & Freeman; Jacob Bros,; Goldsmith
& Lowenberg; Allen & Lewis; M. Sellers & Co.; and W. & Co. Certainly half, and perhaps
all, are identifiably Jewish surnames (excepting, of course, the last).
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Savage & Reed, the suit commenced. Wood obtained a verdict for $4,400.00.^*^ The verdict
(and the denial of the motion for a new trial) was appealed to and sustained by the Supreme
Court of the State of Montana on July 29, 1887, and, upon fiirther appeal (Writ o f Error) to
the United States Supreme Court, allowed to stand when no transcript was presented when
the case was called for hearing.

Again, the Wood case presented the kind o f case, and the

kind o f file, that one would expect to find in a commercial center, not a frontier backwater.
The story o f the practice in the 1880's is not a story of picturesque frontier cases.
Missoula remained an isolated Western town, but its litigation fit the contours of the
increasingly urban, commercial and affluent society that America became after the Civil War.
Stephens and Bickford represented Darwin Loveland in a suit against The Missoula National
Bank, alleging that the bank had failed to turn over $12,757.89 worth of notes (face value)
on demand. The bank disputed Loveland's ownership and the suit was apparently settled.
Stephens and Bickford dismissed the case at plaintiffs costs.^"'* The result o f the was less
important than the magnitude o f the sum in question and the nature o f the dispute,
commercial notes on deposit.
Stephens and Bickford represented the firm of Bass Bros., lumber dealers, in a suit
against Henry Lamb and John L. Sloan, after the defendants refiised to pay for lumber used
to construct a barber shop on the north side of Front Street. As a provider of labor and
materials, Bass Bros, was entitled to perfect a mechanic's lien, which they did do, and upon

689-865.
^“^No. 174, October Term, 1891.
^“‘‘10,-2055 et. seq. Some pages are not stamped.
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which Stephens and Bickford sought to foreclose.^®* Here again, the litigation lacked the feel
of the frontier. It had, instead, the familiar feel o f modem litigation and its devices. No case
in the 1870s proceeded upon a mechanic’s lien.
Thomas Adams got into trouble with the credit department o f the Eddy, Hammond
& Co., and found himself sued by The Missoula Mercantile Company, "a corporation existing
under the laws of the territory o f Montana." Eddy, Hammond & Co. had incorporated.
Adams retained Stephens & Bickford, who joined with the Woody & Marshall, plaintiffs
attorney, in stipulating that the matter be submitted to binding arbitration. At the arbitration,
Adams adduced receipts evidencing that he had paid part of the claim; the decision ordered
Adams to pay the balance. The stipulation specified that the referee's report would be entered
as a judgement, but that did not occur. The file contained a dismissal prepared by counsel for
Missoula Mercantile, according to which the plaintiff would bear all costs.

Perhaps there

were further negotiations after the arbitration, and perhaps as well, the store made further
concessions to assuage the feelings of its customer. Like the preceding cases, Adams had the
aura of modernity. It was not a dispute between neighbors, but rather a suit by a corporate
retailer against a defaulting customer.
On February 24, 1887, Stephens and Bickford filed a complaint on behalf o f "Frank
L. Worden & Christopher P. Higgins partners under the firm name and style of Worden &

1, 1794-1797. A "mechanics lien" is a lien the law allows to a person or corporation
which provides labor or materials to a construction project. The lien attaches to the property
which is the site of the construction.
206

12, 991-1024.
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was a simple matter, a suit upon a promissory note in default, made by one John

L. Sloane in the amount o f two hundred sixty-two dollars. However, Stephens must have
been pleased, at last, to represent the town founders. The firm's reputation and experience
undoubtedly contributed to its selection. Another reason, however, was suggested at the
bottom of the complaint, which was signed Stephens & Bickford F. G. Higgins Attys for
PltfFs." The firm was appearing along with another attorney, Frank G. Higgins, son of the
town's patriarch and, not coincidentally, one of the plaintifis. Frank G Higgins, then, brought
to the firm something besides the willingness to work that typified a young attorney; he
brought along one o f the county's biggest business clients. The complaint, and subsequent
cases, inferred that the three were not as yet in partnership. Higgins was identified separately
and not as a member of the firm. Perhaps Christopher P. Higgins gave the business to his son
and suggested that he get some help from more experienced attorneys. In that way, young
Higgins could avoid cutting into his prospective inheritance as he cut his teeth on the law.
Stephens and Bickford kept cases they acquired by themselves to themselves for some
months. On May 13, 1887 they represented Orlin J. Luce and Samuel Slife against the Sun
Insurance Company of San Francisco, a lle ^ g that the carrier had failed to pay on a claim for
the destruction by fire o f an insured dwelling. The complaint affixed a copy o f the policy,
which provided some insights into the hazards of the fire insurance business o f the nineteenth
century ("Kerosine oil may be used for lights in stores and dwellings").^”* On May 24, 1887

^“’12, 2026 et. seq. Frank Worden was improperly identified as a party. He had died
nineteen days earlier. His executor was the proper party.
208

13, 56 et. seq.
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Stephens & Bickford again represented a Higgins' interest, this time representing Christopher
P Higgins alone as "surviving partner of the firm o f Worden & Co." Frank G. Higgins did
not appear on the complaint or otherwise in the file at all.^®^
On October 21, 1887 Stephens & Bickford represented the National Fire Insurance
Company of Hartford against R. M. Morrison and C B. Mahoney, alleging in a typewritten
pleading that Morrison and Mahoney were insurance representatives for the plaintiff who had
failed to transmit received premiums. An out o f state institutional client like this plaintiff
would have been a feather in the cap of any lawyer. The case indicated the growing
reputation of Stephens & Bickford. Such a client surely sought referral to a reputable local
firm. An insurance company selling policies in the Missoula Valley would have future claims
to defend there as well. Stephens & Bickford did not share this potentially important case
with Frank Higgins.
On November 5, 1887, Christopher P. Higgins, again as surviving partner of Worden
& Co., sued John Shaughnessy for defaulting on two notes. Stephens & Bickford and Frank
G. Higgins represented Higgins. Again, the arrangement on its face is the firm of Stephens
& Higgins as co-counsel with an individual attorney, Frank G. Higgins.^" Frank Higgins was
admitted to the firm as a partner in March o f 1888.^'^

209

13, 91

ggq

^*“13, 91 et. seq.
^^43, 1614 et. seq.
^‘^Testimony before D. H. Ross, Esq., Referee, Missoula County Case No. 1291, Stephens
v Bickford.
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Frank Higgins was surely on board when the firm defended the Missoula Water Works
& Milling Company and the Town of Missoula against the claim of August Scheer in 1888.
This was a rare action for personal injury. Scheer alleged that on the night of February 6,
1888, while walking on either Higgins or Pine (the complaint is not clear), he fell into a
portion of a ditch which had been opened to either lay or maintmn the water pipe. Scheer said
he injured his head and his hip and that he could not work for three weeks. He alleged that
the water company neglected to light the hole, thereby exposing pedestrians to an
unreasonable risk of harm. The answer submitted on behalf of the Missoula Water Works and
Milling Company was handsomely typed.

It made a marked contrast with the nearly

unintelligible handwritten complaint George Reeves had offered on behalf of Scheer. On the
folder enveloping the answer was stamped; "Stephens, Bickford & Higgins." After this,
Stephens participation in the case, and the existence or non-existence of the firm itself
becomes vague. In June o f 1890, another attorney, Marshall, asked for subpoenas on the
defendant's behalf. Then, on June 13, Bickford applied for a continuance on the grounds of
witness unavailability. The defendant submitted proposed jury instructions on November 25,
1890, credited as follows: "Marshall & Crutchfield & F. G. Higgins & W. M. Bickford Attys
for Deft." The jury brought in a verdict for the defense.^^^
The story between the lines was that Stephens was retiring. He continued to practice
and the firm o f Stephens, Bickford & Higgins still existed on February 15, 1889, when it

^^^Angiist Scheer vs. Missoula Water Works and Milling Company, Case No. 1026. At
this point documents are no longer identified by transcript number.
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represented the McCormick Harvesting Company in a collection action.^^'* In 1890, however,
while the Scheer suit was ongoing, Stephens went to California. On November 13, 1890, he
sued Milan Conant on a note secured by real property. In the complaint, Stephens stated,
through his counsel, that he had mistakenly executed an affidavit indicating that the debt was
paid, and releasing the mortgage. The complaint sets forth the affidavit, dated October 8,
1890, and made in San Jose County, California. Stephens was not even in Montana at the
time o f the Scheer trial; he was in California attempting to save his marriage.

More

important, a law firm styled Stephens, Matts, and Denny represented Stephens against
Conant.^^® He was no longer associated with Bickford or Higgins.
The testimony in the suit between Stephens and Bickford, in 1896, confirmed that they
had severed all ties, including both the law firm and the real estate business they conducted
together, at the end of 1889. Why and how Stephens became affiliated with Matts and Denny
is unknown. His role was probably to add the prestige o f his name to the letterhead. Frank
Higgins apparently sided with Stephens. His father, Christopher P. Higgins had died on
October 14, 1889. Along with John R. Higgins, George C. Higgins, presumably his brothers,
and his mother Julia P. Higgins, Frank was appointed Executor of his father's will. As the
lawyer of the family, he probably could have selected any firm in town to represent the estate.
When the Executors sued Maurice Holden upon a note in favor of Christopher Higgins,
Stephens, Matts, and Denny brought the complaint.

^^^ b e McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. vs. Monroe Fulkerson. Case No. 1163. Here
they represented another impressive out o f state Corporation.
^^^CaseNo. 180.
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Conclusion

This concludes my efforts to portray a frontier practice in the late nineteenth century,
and to anchor it to its many contexts. These contexts have included the Anglo-Saxon folk
legal tradition, the elitist influences o f the Inns of Court (including the professionalization of
the bar), the emerging American legal experience in the colonies and the early republic, the
development o f a frontier commercial center, and the life of a William J. Stephens. A play
cannot commence until the house lights are brought up. While I knew that the presentation
of so many contexts would of necessity limit the treatment of each, I expected that each
context would light the stage.
A study of the law practiced in frontier Missoula brings many matters to light. It
documents the survival o f basic procedural objectives from distant times, notably the use of
oaths and security pledges to promote veracity. The study also reveals contrasts with modern
practice. Students of frontier law are quick to point out that the frontier lawyers were skilled.
Modem scholars eschew any overall depiction which, however affectionately, ridicules the
old-timers. Rather, they insist that lawyers such as W. J. Stephens were, by and large, good
lawyers. Lastly, these writers impress upon us that the frontier bar compares favorably to the
present one.^^®
But I would take this a step further. How well do contemporary lawyers compare

^‘^See, for example, Elizabeth Caspar Brown, "The Bar on the Frontier: Wayne County
1796-1830," American Journal of Legal History. Vol 14, 136-156; C. Robert Haywood,
Cowtown I^awvers Dodge Citv and its Attorneys. (Norman: University;of Oklahoma Press,
1988); Gordon Morris Bakken. Practicing Law in Frontier California. (Lincoln: University
o f Nebraska Press, 1991).
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with their predecessors on the frontier? Certainly modern lawyers are better trained and have
many more tools at their disposal. In view of the objectives o f the legal process, perhaps we
are the ones who should like the comparison.
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Afterward (A Note on Technology)

By the time William J. Stephens ceased practicing law in 1890, the legal profession
had entered the modem era. By the time he died, in 1917, case files had forever lost the
aspect of the fi'ontier. There were no more handwritten pleadings, no more loans payable in
gold dust. At the same time, the legal profession hardly can be said to have entered a static
phase. The twentieth century subsequently witnessed vast changes, most particularly the tort
and computer revolutions.
The lawyers o f Stephens' generation had their own mechanical revolution. The
typewriter came into use during the latter part of the 1880's. One of the more interesting
questions unexplored by this thesis is the impact of the typewriter. After the general adoption
of typewritten documents, court files are considerably thicker. Since the typewriter made
legal paperwork less laborious, it should come as no surprise that its advent generated more
paper. Moreover, the thickness of the files was attributable to lengthier complaints and other
filings, rather than new forms.
The adversarial process of litigation claims to be effective in getting at the truth. A
mechanical breakthrough which improved the ability lawyers to wield their truth finding tools
in litigation ought to have produced more effective litigation. But did it? That question
deserves an exhaustive inquiry. Nothing in the denser files suggested that the public was
being more efficiently served.
In our own day we have seen the arrival o f the computer. Surely, no one could have
thought of an instrument that fitted the administrative energies of a law office more precisely.
98
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After all, law ofiBce administration began as form accumulation and copying. Has more paper
meant better quality? Few could seriously suggest that it has. If the mm of litigation is
efficient, rapid, affordable, and final dispute resolution, modem litigants, once again, ought
to envy the world of frontier Missoula.
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